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ABSTRACT. We propose a new method for studying environments with unobserved
individual heterogeneity. Based on model-implied pairwise inequalities, the method
classifies individuals in the sample into groups defined by discrete unobserved
heterogeneity with unknown support. We establish conditions under which the
groups are identified and consistently estimated through our method. We show
that the method performs well in finite samples through Monte Carlo simulation.
We then apply the method to estimate a model of low-price procurement auctions
with unobserved bidder heterogeneity, using data from the California highway
procurement market.
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1. Introduction
The empirical analysis of many economic settings requires accounting for unobserved
individual heterogeneity (UIH) which reflects agent-specific factors that influence agents’
decisions but are not recorded in the data. Failing to account for UIH generally leads to
biased estimates and affects the validity of counterfactual prediction.
In this paper, we consider a generic economic model where UIH induces a group struc-
ture among agents according to their types. We provide conditions for identification of
the group structure, and propose a method to recover the group structure from data.
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2Our main idea is based on the insight that UIH often implies pairwise inequality re-
strictions on endogenous observable quantities. For instance, in multi-attribute auctions,
bidders with higher (unobserved) quality levels have a greater chance of winning the auc-
tion, controlling for the bid and the set of competitors. In a labor market setting, agents
with higher (unobserved) productivity receive higher wages than less productive ones.
In Section 2.2 we provide further examples of economic applications in which pairwise
inequality restrictions arise naturally from the behavior of agents in equilibrium.
We develop a statistical method to recover the group structure (that is, to classify indi-
viduals into groups defined by UIH) using a pairwise comparison approach. Our method
treats UIH as individual-specific discrete parameters which may affect the distribution of
other observed or unobserved variables. Such flexibility is important in structural models
where individuals interact strategically and the UIH of all agents jointly affects the equi-
librium outcome. Our method is nonparametric, i.e., does not assume that UIH belongs
to any parametric family of distributions, or that the support of discrete UIH is known.
A naive classification of individuals into groups based on pairwise inequality tests does
not necessarily yield a coherent group structure in finite samples in general. Our method
recovers the whole group structure by sequentially sub-dividing the set of agents on the
basis of the p-values of tests of pairwise inequality restrictions. The method recovers
the group structure for each assumed number of groups, and then selects the number of
groups (and the associated group structure) using a penalization scheme. We show that
our estimator of the group structure is consistent under mild regularity conditions and
performs well in small samples.
In many settings, classifying individuals into groups defined by UIH offers key eco-
nomic insights. For example, our method can be used to identify colluding bidders in
auctions, and firms’ cost asymmetries or product quality differences. In addition, re-
covering the group structure also often serves as the first step for estimating structural
models with strategic interactions, such as dynamic industry models or auctions with
asymmetric bidders.1
This approach offers a feasible way to identify and estimate games with UIH. Specifi-
cally, a traditional approach in a setting with UIH would be to treat UIH as “fixed effects”
1Estimation of discrete unobserved individual heterogeneity does not affect subsequent estimation of other
structural parameters in terms of pointwise asymptotics. However, establishing uniform asymptotics re-
mains an open question. This problem is analogous to that of post-model-selection inference. For discus-
sion on the issues, see Po¨tcher (1991), Leeb and Po¨tcher (2005), and Andrews and Guggenberger (2009)
and the references therein. Uniform asymptotics in our setup is complex because of the need to consider
every possible direction of local perturbation from the actual group structure in data-generating process. A
full theoretical investigation of the issue in our context merits a separate paper.
3and estimate them jointly with other structural parameters. This approach poses practi-
cal challenges in a setting with agent interdependence, especially when equilibrium out-
comes admits no closed-form expressions. First, it is generally not obvious what variation
in the data may identify model components including the fixed effects in such settings.
One of the contributions of our paper is to point out the variation which identifies the
group structure associated with “fixed effects.”
Further, we propose to separate the recovery of the group structure from the estimation
of other structural parameters. Recovering the group membership of every agent facil-
itates, and is often needed for, identifying the remaining structural elements in models
with strategic interactions. A classical example is English auctions among bidders with
unobserved types (in the sense that bidders’ private values are drawn independently from
the distributions “labeled” by bidder type) and where the data only report the transaction
price and the identity of the winner. Athey and Haile (2007) show that the distributions
of private values cannot be identified in this model if the type of the auction winner is
unknown. We provide details and additional examples in the supplemental note to this
paper.
Finally, our approach offers a way to estimate games with UIH with substantially low
computational cost, compared with the alternative approach of estimating the fixed ef-
fects jointly with other structural parameters. For example, consider an environment with
a large number of players where many independent games (each containing only a small
subset of players) are observed in the data. The numerical optimization (such as simu-
lated GMM or MLE) requires evaluating the objective function which involves computing
equilibrium for each value of the fixed effects and other structural parameters. This can
be computationally prohibitive in practice. In contrast, our method allows the game to
be solved only for the estimated configuration of the agents’ group memberships rather
than for every possible configuration as is required under the joint estimation.2
Our method is advantageous especially in settings where the number of agents is mod-
erately large but each market (observation) in the data involves only a small subset of
participants. For example, the total number of participants may be several hundreds but
each market may contain only several participants. In this case, despite the large number
of markets observed, the researcher may have only a small number of markets which
contain the same set of participants. We call this issue the problem of the sparsely common
set of agents. In such settings, the researcher cannot build inference on the conditional
moments given the full set of participating agents in a market, as typically done in the
structural empirical literature, because we do not have many such observations. Hence
2Krasnokutskaya, Song, and Tang (2018) used this classification method as a first step in the structural
analysis of an online service market for computer coding.
4the researcher needs to “aggregate” the markets or the agents in order to conduct reli-
able inference with sufficiently many observations. Pairwise restrictions are testable with
accuracy even when the data exhibit sparsely common sets of agents since the number
of markets where a given pair of agents is present tends to be large even if the number
of markets with the same set of participants is small. Thus, pairwise restrictions and
the classification procedure offer a natural way to aggregate agents into groups which
permits estimation of other primitives.
We investigate the finite sample performance of our classification method in Monte
Carlo simulation. The data-generating process (DGP) is a lowest-price procurement auc-
tion among asymmetric bidders whose independent private values are drawn from dis-
tributions with different means. We report the outcome of classification for DGPs with
various numbers of bidders and group structures. Our classification method works well.
Its performance is better when the number of bidders and groups are smaller relative to
the number of observed markets/games, and when the differences between groups are
larger. We also find that the impact of classification errors on subsequent estimation of
other structural parameters in the game is non-substantial.
We analyze the California highway procurement market by applying our classification
method to a model of asymmetric lowest-price procurement auction. Existing empiri-
cal studies of auction markets typically emphasized asymmetry in bidders’ private values
associated with their observable characteristics.3 In comparison, we allow the bidders’
private values to be drawn from heterogeneous distributions with different means. To
account for other sources of cost heterogeneity, we control for bidders’ distance to the
project site. We also accommodate possible endogeneity in the competitive structure. We
use the classification method to recover the unknown group structure (i.e., partition bid-
ders into groups with different mean costs). Then, using this estimated group structure,
we estimate group-specific cost distributions using GMM.
Our estimates indicate that the bidders in the data come from several unobserved
groups with substantial differences in mean costs. We also find that ignoring such unob-
served bidder heterogeneity would lead to biased estimates of how bidders’ costs depend
on various factors.
Related Literature. One of the popular methods of accounting for UIH in structural
modeling is to adopt finite mixtures. (See Hu (2008), Hu and Schennach (2008), Kasa-
hara and Shimotsu (2009), Hu and Shum (2012), Hu and Shiu (2013), Hu, McAdams,
3For example, Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011), Roberts and Sweeting (2013) and Aradillas-Lopez, Gandhi,
and Quint (2013) accounted for the bidder heterogeneity associated with size in the timber market (‘mills’
vs ‘loggers’); Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and Gentry, Komarova,
and Shiraldi (2016) incorporated bidder participation differences in highway procurement market (‘reg-
ular’ vs ‘fringe’ bidders); Conley and Decarolis (2016), Asker (2010) and Pesendorfer (2000) allowed for
bidder heterogeneity in collusive behaviors.
5and Shum (2013), and Henry, Kitamura, and Salanie (2014). See also See Kasahara and
Shimotsu (2014) and Kasahara and Shimotsu (2015) for estimating and testing for the
number of mixture components in finite mixture models.) The finite mixture modeling
assumes that the UIH is a random variable drawn from some unknown distribution. The
goal is to identify this distribution and estimate it from data. It does not require each
individual to appear in many independent games. In contrast, our approach aims to clas-
sify individual agents in the sample into disjoint groups defined by their realized unobserved
types, using their participation outcomes in many games. Thus the two approaches are
fundamentally different both in their aims and their data requirements. While general
identification results have been developed in this literature of finite mixture models (see,
e.g., Bonhomme, Jochmans, and Robin (2016)), implementation of the finite-mixture
method is impractical in our set-up due to the issue of sparse commonality, and technical
issues associated with high dimensionality.4
The classification algorithm we propose is related to the clustering method in statis-
tics. (See, e.g., Chapter 14 of Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2009).) The main
difference is that the clustering method groups individuals based on similarity of their
observed attributes, whereas our approach groups individuals based on their unobserved
attributes. To do so, we exploit the relationship between endogenous outcome and the
unobserved types of individuals implied by an economic model. Our method also requires
a data structure different from clustering methods. The literature of clustering methods
mostly considers a set-up in which each cross-sectional unit is observed once, whereas
our method uses many observations per individual in the sample.
Also related to our approach is the literature of panel models with group level het-
erogeneity. For example, Sun (2005) introduced a linear panel model where parameters
take values in a finite set according to a logistic probability, and offered methods of es-
timating the group structure. Song (2005) considered a panel model with finite-valued
nonstochastic parameters and produced an algorithm to recover the unobserved group
structure in large panel models. Lin and Ng (2012) provided a method of estimating
a panel model using threshold variables when the group membership is unknown. Su,
Shi, and Phillips (2016) developed a new Lasso method to recover the unknown group-
specific parameters. Bonhomme and Manresa (2014) proposed a k-means clustering al-
gorithm to recover the group structure in a linear panel model. These papers often focus
on models which admit a reduced form for the dependent variable in which its functional
relation to UIH is made explicit. In contrast, our method targets a set-up where the
dependence of the outcome variables on the UIH arises implicitly through equilibrium
4When each market is drawn from a finte mixture distribution, and there are I agents with each having a
type from S values, the number of the mixture components becomes SI which can be very large in pratice,
even when I is a moderate number such as five or ten.
6contraints in games, and the group structure of UIH is identified only through pairwise
inequality restrictions. Thus, the approaches developed in the panel literature are not
applicable in settings our proposal focuses on.
Roadmap. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic environment
and defines pairwise inequality restrictions. This section also provides several examples
from various contexts to motivate our classification method.
Section 3 establishes identification of the unobserved group structure using pairwise
inequality restrictions. Section 4 proposes a consistent estimator of the group structure.
Section 5 provides results from Monte Carlo simulation. Section 6 presents the empirical
application. Section 7 concludes. Further examples and mathematical proofs are pro-
vided in the supplemental note of this paper. The note also contains further simulation
results and details in our empirical application.
2. The Model and Examples
2.1. Pairwise Inequalities in Game Models
We consider a setting where the econometrician observes L games, and in each game,
a set of agents interact with each other. Each agent i is associated with a non-stochastic
type, qi, which is not observed by the researcher. We assume that the type is finte-valued
so that qi ∈ Q0 = {q¯1, ..., q¯K0}, with q¯1 < · · · < q¯K0. This induces an (ordered) partition
(N1, N2, ..., NK0) of the set N of agents such that for each k = 2, ..., K0, Nk consists of
agents with higher type than those in Nk−1. The group structure is characterized by a
function τ : N → {1, ..., K0} that links the identity of a player to his unobserved type so
that qi = q¯τ(i) and for each k = 1, ..., K0,
Nk = {i ∈ N : τ(i) = k} .
The data available to the researcher contain for every observation l = 1, ..., L: a vector
of observable characteristics for all the agents involved, {Xj,l}j∈Sl, as well as at least one
but possibly multiple vectors of outcome variables, Yl = {Yj,l}j∈Sl, where Sl is the set of
players involved in each observation (e.g., a game or a market). Our main focus is on
recovering the ordered partition (N1, N2, ..., NK0) of agents from data.
The main insight of our paper begins with the observation that in many structural mod-
els, the ordering among qi’s (or equivalently τ(i)’s) coincides with the ordering between
indexes that can be estimated consistently. Specifically, we use pairwise indexes δij and
7δ0ij that satisfy the following relations:
5
δij > 0 if and only if τ(i) > τ(j);(2.1)
δ0ij = 0 if and only if τ(i) = τ(j),
where the indexes δij and δ0ij can be consistently estimated using the sample. In many
applications, we can take the indexes as (a variant of) the following form:
δij =
∫
max{E[Yi,l|Xi,l = x]− E[Yj,l|Xj,l = x], 0}dF (x), and(2.2)
δ0ij =
∫
|E[Yi,l|Xi,l = x]− E[Yj,l|Xj,l = x]| dF (x),
where F is a known distribution or the distribution of an observable random vector.
For example, suppose that the outcome Yi,l admits the following reduced form:
Yi,l = g(τ(i), Xi,l, ηi,l),
where g is a function that is strictly increasing in τ(i) and ηi,l is an unobserved component
that is independent of Xi,l. Then under regularity conditions, we obtain the pairwise
relations (2.1) with (2.2). The main advantage of our approach is that we do not require
an explicit characterization of the reduced form g. Due to this flexibility, our approach is
most useful for analyzing UIH in structural models where the reduced form for outcomes
arises only implicitly through equilibrium constraints. In such a setting, the sign of the
indexes δij represents the pairwise relation which says that between any two agents, one
agent’s type is higher than the other if and only if his outcome tends to be higher than
that of the other. As we demonstrate through examples below, many structural models
imply these pairwise relations through indexes δij and δ0ij.
The main goal of this paper is to develop a statistical procedure to recover the group
structure τ from data. Our method relies only on the pairwise inequality restrictions in
(2.1). Thus so far as the group structure is concerned, the pairwise comparison indexes
δij and δ0ij play the role of a sufficient statistic; the recovery of the group structure does
not rely on other details of the structural model.
2.2. Examples
We now provide examples of how pairwise inequality restrictions arise as equilibrium
implications in a variety of commonly studied empirical contexts.
5For the sake of concreteness, our exposition in the paper focuses on this form of indexes. Our procedures
rely on the indexes only through the availability of consistent tests of pairwise inequality restrictions:
δij > 0 and δ0ij = 0. As long as such consistent tests are available, one can use our method for other forms
of pairwise indexes.
82.2.1. Unobserved Quality in Multi-attribute Auctions. Consider a simplified version
of multi-attribute auctions in Krasnokutskaya, Song, and Tang (2018) that abstracts away
from observed auction and seller heterogeneity. Let N denote the population of sellers
and Sl the set of sellers who submitted bids for a project l. Each seller has a discrete
unobservable quality: qi ∈ {q¯1, ..., q¯K0}, with q¯k < q¯k′ whenever k < k′. Such a quality is
known to buyers but not reported in data. The buyer for project l selects a seller among
those who submitted bids or chooses an outside option to maximize his payoff. The
payoff to the buyer from engaging services of seller i ∈ Sl is given by Ui,l = αlqi+i,l−Bi,l
whereas the payoff from an outside option is U0,l. Here αl is a non-negative weight the
buyer gives to the seller’s quality relative to the seller’s bid, whereas i,l reflects a buyer-
seller match-specific stochastic component.
Let us suppress the auction subscript l and define for any two sellers i, j,
ρij(b) = P { iwins |Bi = b, i ∈ S, j 6∈ S} ,
for all b on the intersection of the supports of Bi and Bj. Suppose α, S, {Ci, i}i∈S are
mutually independent.6 Proposition 1 of Krasnokutskaya, Song, and Tang (2018) showed
that
(2.3) sign(ρij(b)− ρji(b)) = sign(qi − qj),
for any b on the intersection of bid supports.
On the basis of this property the comparison indexes can be constructed as follows:
δij ≡
∫
max{ρij(b) − ρji(b), 0}db and δ0ij ≡
∫ |ρij(b)− ρji(b)| db. Note that the comparison
indexes do not depend on other details of the structural model such as specific parametric
assumptions for the distribution of buyers’ tastes.
2.2.2. Firms’ Cost Efficiency and Pricing Decisions. Consider a population of n firms
or brands, each of which produces a single brand of product. The data consists of in-
dependent markets indexed by l = 1, ..., L. The marginal cost for firm i on market l is
ci,l = ϕ(wi,l, qi, ηi,l), where wi,l are observable cost shifters, qi a brand-specific unobserved
heterogeneity that is fixed across markets, and ηi,l’s are i.i.d. idiosyncratic noises inde-
pendent from wi,l and qi. We may interpret qi as a measure of firm i’s cost efficiency. Firms
have complete information about each others’ cost efficiencies.7 Firms in the population
are partitioned into groups with different levels of qi: N = ∪kNk where i ∈ Nk if τ(i) = k.
Let σi,l(xl, pl,Ωl) denote firm is’ market shares, which is a function of product attributes
(xl = {xi,l}i∈Sl, where Sl denotes the set of brands in market l) and prices (pl = {pi,l}i∈Sl)
6This holds, for example, if sellers are not informed of the weights or outside option of the buyer, or the
identities of other sellers in Sl.
7This assumption is plausible in certain industries where production efficiency is mostly determined by
firms’ technology or equipment that is publicly observable.
9conditional on the set of products available in market l and other market factors denoted
by Ωl. The profit for firm i in market l is: pii,l = (pi,l − ci,l)σi,l(xl,pl)Ml, where Ml is a
measure of potential consumers in market l. In any pricing equilibrium with an interior
solution, the first-order condition implies
(2.4) ci,l = pi,l +
σi,l
∂σi,l/∂pi,l
.
Notice that if ηi,l is independent from qi and wi,l, and ϕ(wi,l, qi, ηi,l) is strictly monotone
in qi then so is the right-hand side of (2.4), which can be constructed from estimates of
the demand system. Hence, for any pair i, j ∈ N , qi ≥ qj if and only if E[zi,l|wi,l = w0] ≥
E[zj,l|wj,l = w0], for all w0, where zi,l is defined as the quantity on the right hand side of
(2.4). The statement is also true when both inequalities are strict. Thus we can define a
pairwise comparison index
(2.5) δij ≡
∫
max{E[zi,l|wi,l = w0]− E[zj,l|wj,l = w0], 0}dF (w0),
where F is the distribution of wi,l. In equilibrium δij > 0 if and only if qi > qj. Likewise,
define δ0ij by replacing max{·, 0} in the integral in δij with the absolute value. These
pairwise comparison indexes do not condition on specific identities of firms in a market.
2.2.3. Assortative Matching in Labor Market. Sorting of heterogeneous employees
across heterogeneous firms has been studied in Lentz and Mortensen (2010), Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), and Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2011). In a typical setting,
firms are heterogeneous in the productivity from a given worker ceteris paribus. Work-
ers differ in their unobservable ability qi. Under further restrictions (see Eeckhout and
Kircher (2011) and Hagedorn, Law, and Manovskii (2016)), workers with higher ability
would in equilibrium earn higher wages than co-workers at the same firm, holding other
things equal.
This forms a basis for pairwise comparisons. Specifically, let wi,f,t = W (qi, Xi,t,Ωf,t)
denote the wage worker i earns at time t while employed by firm f , where W is a non-
stochastic function. Here Ωf,t captures all the relevant firm-specific unobservable factors
while Xi,t reflects worker i’s characteristics other than qi. Using Nf,t to denote the set of
workers employed by firm f at time t, we define the comparison index as
δij =
∫
max{E[wi,f,t|Xi,t = x]− E[wj,f,t|Xi,t = x], 0}dF (x), i, j ∈ Nf,t,
where F is the distribution of Xi,t. Then δij > 0 if and only if qi > qj, under regularity
conditions such as strict mononicity of W in qi. Likewise before, define δ0ij by replacing
the max operator in δij with its absolute value. In this setting comparison of workers
is complicated by the (unobserved) firm heterogeneity and sorting of workers across
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FIGURE 1. The first panel shows an example of a data set where the set of participants is
the same across all markets. The second panel shows another example of data where only
a small fraction of markets share the same set of participants. As illustrated here, there
are only three markets where the set of participants is precisely {1, 3, 4}. The third panel
shows that there are many more markets in the second example where both agents 1 and
3 (represented by white ellipses) participate. Thus a researcher can estimate population
quantities that condition on the joint participation of these two agents with better accuracy
than quantities that condition on the whole set of participants.
firms. Pairwise comparisons allow researchers to circumvent these issues by focusing on
workers’ wages earned while they are employed by the same firm.
2.3. Sparsely Common Set of Agents and Pairwise Inequalities
Our pairwise comparison method is most useful in a setting where players appear in a
market only sparsely. To express this data feature, define for any S ⊂ N ,
L(S) = {1 ≤ l ≤ L : Sl = S}.
Thus L(S) represents the set of markets where the set of participants in a market Sl is
precisely S. In this paper, we refer to the setting as that of a sparsely common set of agents,
if the proportion maxS⊂N |L(S)|/L is negligible in finite sample. In other words, only a
small fraction of the markets in the sample share exactly the same set of participants.
The setting with a sparsely common set of agents is illustrated in Figure 1, where each
column symbolizes a “market” and each row an individual agent. The ellipses in each
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column represent agents participating in a market. The first panel shows a standard set-
up where all the agents appear in all the markets. The second panel shows an example of
a data set where only very few markets share exactly the same set of participants {1, 3, 4}.
Therefore, the conditional choice probability given the same set of agents simultaneously
participating in the market cannot be accurately estimated. However, if we focus on
only subsets with two agents {1, 3}, there are many more markets in which the two
agents participate. Aggregating over these markets, one may infer accurately the ordering
between the two agents using an inequality test. Given the p-values from inequality tests
across pairs of agents, it remains to recover the whole group structure of the agents from
these pairwise p-values. We develop an algorithm that recover the group structure from
the pairwise p-values consistently.
3. Identification of the Ordered Group Structure
We say that agents (i, j) are comparable if there exist consistently estimable pairwise
indexes δij and δ0ij such that (2.1) holds. In this identification analysis, we assume that a
researcher knows whether each pair of agents is comparable through some pairwise com-
parison index or not. The determination of such comparability can be done in practice
by checking whether the data contains sufficiently many markets which allow for reliable
estimation of the pairwise indexes.
Let E be the collection of pairs (i, j) that are comparable. We refer to comparable
agents as adjacent (or linked), so that the set E forms the set of edges in a graph on the
set of agents N . We call this graph (denoted by G = (N, E)) the comparability graph.8 We
say a group structure τ is identified if it is uniquely determined once the comparability
graph G and the vectors of pairwise indexes (δij, δ0ij)ij∈E are known.
Let us explore the identification of τ given the comparability graph G and the vector of
pairwise indexes. It is easy to see that if E contains only a small subset of possible pairs,
we may not be able to identify the group structure. The identification of the ordered
group structure τ is not guaranteed even when many pairs of agents are comparable. For
example, even if G is a connected graph (where any two agents are connected at least
indirectly), the ordered group structure τ may not be identified. This is illustrated in
a counterexample in Figure 2. Certainly, when every pair of agents are adjacent in the
graph G, i.e., G is a complete graph, the ordered group structure τ is identified.9
8In a graph (or network) G = (N, E) the set N represents the set of vertices (or nodes) and E consists of
some pairs ij, with i, j ∈ N , where each pair ij is called an edge (or link). If (i, j) ∈ E , we say that i and
j are adjacent. A path is a set of vertices {i1, i2, ..., iM} such that i1i2, i2i3, ...iM−1iM ∈ E . Two vertices are
called connected if there is a path having i and j as end vertices. A graph is called connected if all pairs of
vertices are connected in the graph.
9 If all pairs of agents are comparable, we can split the set of agents into one group with the lowest type
and the other group with the remaining agents. Then we split these remaining agents into one group with
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FIGURE 2. This figure illustrates an example where the group structure is not identified
even when all nodes are connected. The comparability graph is G = (N, E), where N =
{1, 2, ..., 5} and E = {12, 23, 34, 45}. Pairwise comparison is feasible only between nodes
linked by solid black lines (a.k.a. links). The two different group structures in this figure
are compatible with the same pairwise ordering. Therefore we cannot identify the group
structure from pairwise orderings.
High
Med
Low
Node 5
Node 1
Node 2
Node 4
Node 6
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Node 1
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Node 4
Node 6
Type
Node 3
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Node 1
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Node 6
Type
FIGURE 3. This figure shows an example where the condition N = N∗ in Theorem 3.1
is violated. The first panel depicts the comparability graph as one connecting 6 vertices (or
nodes). The second panel shows the τ -collapsed graph where the two comparable nodes
2 and 3 that have the same type are collapsed into one node named 23. The last panel
shows that Nodes 23, 4, and 5 (expressed as solid black nodes) are identified, because
they are on a monotone path of length K0− 1 = 2. In this example, Nodes 1 and 6 are not
identified and thus the comparable graph does not lead to the identification of the group
structure.
Below we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the group structure to be
identified from an incomplete graph G and the pairwise comparison indexes. Let us
introduce some definitions.
the lowest type within these agents and the remaining agents. By continuing this process, we can identify
the whole group structure.
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Definition 3.1. (i) A graph Gτ is the τ -collapsed graph of G if (a) any two adjacent
vertices i and j in G with τ(i) = τ(j) collapse to a single vertex (denoted by (ij)) in Gτ ,
(b) any edge in G joining a vertex k to either i or j joins vertex k to (ij) in Gτ and (c) all
the remaining vertices and edges in Gτ consist of the remaining vertices and edges in G.
(ii) A path in Gτ is monotone if τ(i) is monotone as i runs along the path.
(iii) A vertex i is said to be identified if its type τ(i) is identified.
The τ -collapsed graph of G is constructed by reducing any comparable pair of agents
in G who have the same type to a single “agent”, and retaining edges as in the original
graph of G. Certainly, a τ -collapsed graph Gτ is uniquely determined by δ0ij ’s and G. Any
pair of adjacent agents in the τ -collapsed graph must have different types, and hence the
types of agents on a monotone path are strictly monotone. This means that every vertex
on a monotone path in Gτ of length K0 − 1 is identified.10 Also by similar logic, every
vertex on a monotone path with end vertices iH and iL is identified if the path has length
τ(iH)− τ(iL) and the end vertices iH and iL are identified. Using these two facts, we can
recover the set of vertices that are identified as follows.
First, let N[1] ⊂ N denote the set of vertices such that each vertex in the τ -collapsed
graph Gτ is on a monotone path in Gτ of length K0 − 1. For j ≥ 1 generally, let N[j+1]
be the set of vertices each of which belongs to a monotone path, say, P , such that its end
vertices iH and iL are from N[j] and τ(iH)− τ(iL) is equal to the length of the monotone
path P . Then define
N∗ ≡
⋃
j≥1
N[j].
Given Gτ , N∗ is uniquely determined as a subset of N . It is not hard to see that if N = N∗
and K0 is identified, the type structure τ is identified. The following theorem shows that
this condition is in fact necessary for the identification of τ as well.
Theorem 3.1. Let G be a given comparability graph and Gτ be its τ -collapsed graph. The
group structure τ is identified if and only if there exists a monotone path in Gτ whose length
is equal to K0 − 1 and N = N∗.
No monotone path in Gτ can have length greater than K0 − 1. Note that there exists a
monotone path in Gτ whose length is equal to K0 − 1 if and only if K0 is identified. The
conditions in the theorem are obviously satisfied if G contains a monotone path that is
monotone and covers all the vetrices. The latter condition is trivially satisfied when G is
a complete graph. Figure 3 gives a counterexample where the condition that there exists
a monotone path in Gτ whose length is equal to K0 − 1 is satisfied, but N 6= N∗ so that
the comparability graph does not lead to the identification of the group structure.
10The length of a path is defined as the number of the edges in the path.
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4. Consistent Estimation of the Ordered Group Structure
4.1. Pairwise Hypothesis Testing Problems
In this section, we develop a method to estimate the group structure consistently for
the case where the comparability graph is complete, so that we take E to be all ij with
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. We first formulate three pairwise hypothesis testing problems for each
comparable pair ij ∈ E:
H+0,ij : δij ≤ 0 against H+1,ij : δij > 0,(4.1)
H00,ij : δ
0
ij = 0 against H
0
1,ij : δ
0
ij 6= 0 and
H−0,ij : δji ≤ 0 against H−1,ij : δji > 0.
In most examples, we have various tests available. Instead of committing ourselves to
a particular method of hypothesis testing, let us assume generally that we are given p-
values pˆ+ij, pˆ
0
ij and pˆ
−
ij from the testing of H
+
0,ij, H
0
0,ij and H
−
0,ij, against H
+
1,ij, H
0
1,ij and H
−
1,ij
respectively. Let L be the size of the sample (i.e., the number of the markets or games)
that is used to construct these p-values. We will explain conditions for the p-values later
and explain details for construction of p-values using bootstrap in Section 4.3.
4.2. The Classification Method
Our classification method consists of two generic algorithmic components: the Split
Algorithm and the Selection-Split Algorithm which contains the Split Algorithm as a com-
ponent.
4.2.1. The Selection-Split Algorithm. Let us introduce a method of obtaining an or-
dered partition (Nˆ ′1, Nˆ
′
2) of a given set N
′ using p-values pˆsij, s ∈ {+, 0,−}.
Definition 4.1. For a subset N ′ ⊂ N , we say that the ordered partition of N ′ into (Nˆ ′1, Nˆ ′2)
is obtained by the Split Algorithm if it is obtained as follows. For each i ∈ N ′, we let
Nˆ ′1(i) = {j ∈ N ′\{i} : log pˆ+ij ≤ log pˆ−ij − rL} and
Nˆ ′2(i) = {j ∈ N ′\{i} : log pˆ−ij ≤ log pˆ+ij − rL},
where rL → ∞ satisfies Assumption 4.1 below.11 Set i∗ = argmini∈N ′ min{s1(i), s2(i)},
where
s1(i) =
1
|Nˆ ′1(i)|
∑
j∈Nˆ ′1(i)
log pˆ+ij, and s2(i) =
1
|Nˆ ′2(i)|
∑
j∈Nˆ ′2(i)
log pˆ−ij.
11In many cases, it suffices to consider a sequence such that rL/ logL → 0. In practice, we propose
rL = (logL)
1/3 which satisfies Assumption 4.1 below under lower level regularity conditions. See Section
C.3 in the supplemental note for details. From our simulations, we find that even choosing rL = 0 works
well in finite samples.
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(We set s1(i) = 0 if Nˆ ′1(i) is empty, and similarly with s(i).) Then we take
(Nˆ ′1, Nˆ
′
2) = (Nˆ
′
1(i
∗), N ′ \ Nˆ ′1(i∗)), if s1(i∗) ≤ s2(i∗);
(Nˆ ′1, Nˆ
′
2) = (N
′ \ Nˆ ′2(i∗), Nˆ ′2(i∗)), if s1(i∗) > s2(i∗).
The set Nˆ ′1(i) estimates the set of agents of lower type than i, and the set Nˆ
′
2(i) estimates
the set of agents of higher type than i. Let
N ′1(i) = {j ∈ N ′ \ {i} : τ(i) > τ(j)}, and N ′2(i) = {j ∈ N ′ \ {i} : τ(i) < τ(j)}.
A necessary condition for Nˆ ′1(i) to coincide with N
′
1(i) is that i has higher type than
those in Nˆ ′1(i). The more negative the quantity s1(i) is, the more likely that this necessary
condition is met. A similar observation applies to s2(i) as well. Thus we choose a partition
that minimizes min{s1(i), s2(i)} over i.
Suppose that we are given an ordered partition (Nˆ ′1, ..., Nˆ
′
s) of N . The Selection-
Split Algorithm that we propose produces an ordered partition (Nˆ ′′1 , ..., Nˆ
′′
s+1) of N from
(Nˆ ′1, ..., Nˆ
′
s) using two steps, the Selection Step and the Split Step, as follows.
1. The Selection Step: Let pˆk = mini,j∈Nˆ ′k:i 6=j pˆ
0
ij, k = 1, ..., s, and select Nˆ
′
k∗ such that
pˆk∗ = min
1≤k≤s
pˆk.
2. The Split Step: We split Nˆ ′k∗ into (Nˆ
′
k∗,1, Nˆ
′
k∗,2) using the Split Algorithm, and relabel
the partition: (Nˆ ′1, ..., Nˆ
′
k∗−1, Nˆ
′
k∗,1, Nˆ
′
r∗,2, Nˆ
′
k∗+1, ..., Nˆ
′
s) = (Nˆ
′′
1 , ..., Nˆ
′′
s+1).
The Selection Step chooses a group Nˆ ′k∗ that is most likely to contain agents with
heterogeneous types and the Split Step splits this group into two sets using the Split
Algorithm. The Selection-Split algorithm depends on the data only through the p-values
pˆsij, s ∈ {+, 0,−}.
4.2.2. The Classification Method. For a given positive integer K, partition N into K
groups as follows. First, split N into (Nˆ [2]1 , Nˆ
[2]
2 ) using the Split Algorithm to N , and apply
the Selection-Split Algorithm sequentially to obtain (Nˆ [3]1 , Nˆ
[3]
2 , Nˆ
[3]
3 ), (Nˆ
[4]
1 , ..., Nˆ
[4]
4 ), and
so on, until we have (Nˆ [K]1 , ..., Nˆ
[K]
K ) for a given number K. For each K, we define
Vˆ (K) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣ mini,j∈Nˆ [K]k log pˆ0ij
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
and then select
Kˆ = argmin1≤K≤nVˆ (K) +Kg(L),
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where g(L) is slowly increasing in L.12 We take TˆKˆ = (Nˆ
[Kˆ]
1 , ..., Nˆ
[Kˆ]
Kˆ
) to be our estimated
group structure. The component Vˆ (K) measures the goodness-of-fit of the classification,
and the second component Kg(L) represents a penalty term that prevents overfitting.
We show that TKˆ is consistent for the underlying group structure T under regularity
conditions.
4.3. Constructing p-Values Using Bootstrap
In most applications, we can use bootstrap to construct p-values for testing the in-
equality restrictions of (4.1).13 For the sake of concreteness, we explain the bootstrap
procedure along the proposal made by Lee, Song, and Whang (2018). Suppose that we
are given observations {Zl}Ll=1, where Zl = (Zi,l)ni=1 denotes the observations pertaining
to market l and Zi,l denotes the vector of observations specific to agent i. Suppose that
for each pair of agents i and j, there exists a nonparametric function, say, rij(x) such that
τ(i) ≥ τ(j) if and only if rij(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X , where X is the common domain of the
function rij(·), i, j ∈ N .
To construct a test statistic, we first estimate rij(x) using the sample {Zl}Ll=1 to ob-
tain rˆij(x) (e.g., using a kernel regression estimator). Then we construct the following
indexes:
δˆij =
∫
max {rˆij(x), 0} dx and δˆ0ij =
∫
|rˆij(x)| dx.(4.2)
For p-values, we re-sample {Z∗l }Ll=1 (with replacement) from the empirical distribution
of {Zl}Ll=1 and construct a nonparametric estimator rˆ∗ij(x) for each pair (i, j) in the same
way as we did using the original sample. Using these bootstrap estimators, we construct
the following bootstrap test statistics:
δˆ∗ij =
∫
max
{
rˆ∗ij(x)− rˆij(x), 0
}
dx and δˆ0∗ij =
∫ ∣∣rˆ∗ij(x)− rˆij(x)∣∣ dx.
Note that the bootstrap test statistic involves recentering to impose the null hypothesis.
Now, the p-values, pˆ+ij, pˆ
−
ij, and pˆ
0
ij can be constructed from the bootstrap distributions of
δˆ∗ij, δˆ
∗
ji, and δˆ
0∗
ij respectively, using δˆij, δˆji and δˆ
0
ij as test statistics.
4.4. Consistency of Classification
We prove consistency of the estimated classification TˆKˆ as L→∞ while n fixed. (The
consistency results and the proof (with high level conditions) for the case of both n and
L increase to infinity can be found in the supplemental note.) Let P be the collection of
12The choice of g(L) = log logL appears to work very well from our numerous Monte Carlo simulation
experiments.
13See Bugni (2010), Andrews and Shi (2013), Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013), Lee, Song, and
Whang (2013), and Lee, Song, and Whang (2018), among many others, and references therein.
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the distributions P of the whole vector of the observations in each market l. For each
ε > 0, ij ∈ E and s ∈ {+, 0,−}, we define
Ps0,ij = {P ∈ P : δsij(P ) ≤ 0}, and Psε,ij = {P ∈ P : δsij(P ) ≥ ε},
where we write the pairwise indexes δsij as δ
s
ij(P ) to reflect that the pairwise indexes de-
pend on P . Thus Ps0,ij is the collection of probabilities under the pairwise null hypothesis
Hs0,ij, and Psε,ij is the collection of probabilities under the pairwise alternative hypotheses
Hs1,ij such that δ
s
ij(P ) is away from zero at least by ε. Then we define
P0,ε =
⋃
s∈{+,0,−}
⋃
ij∈E
(Ps0,ij ∪ Psε,ij).
We assume that the p-value takes the following form:
pˆsij = 1− F˜ sij(T˜ sij), s ∈ {+, 0,−},
where F˜ sij is a CDF and T˜
s
ij is a random variable both of which depend on the data.
Typically, T˜ sij represents an appropriately normalized test statistic and F˜
s
ij represents the
CDF of the bootstrap distribution of the test statistic after recentering. We make the
following assumption.
Assumption 4.1. There exist sequences λL → ∞ and ρL → 0 and constants csij, s ∈
{+, 0,−} such that along each sequence of probabilities PL ∈ P0,ε and for each pair
i, j ∈ N , the following holds for all s ∈ {+, 0,−}, as L→∞.
(i) If τ(i) = τ(j), T˜ sij →d W sij, for some random variable W sij.
(ii) If τ(i) > τ(j), T˜+ij /λL →P c+ij and T˜−ij = OP (1).
(iii) If τ(i) < τ(j), T˜−ij /λL →P c−ij and T˜+ij = OP (1).
(iv) If τ(i) 6= τ(j), T˜ 0ij/λL →P c0ij.
(v) supt∈R |F˜ sij(t)− F sij,∞(t)| = OP (ρL), where F sij,∞ is the CDF of W sij.
(vi) r−1L log(1− F sij,∞(c1λL) + c2ρL)→ −∞, for all constants c1, c2 > 0.
Assumption 4.1 is typically satisfied for various choices of test statistics that arise in
the literature of moment inequality testing. See Section C.2 of the supplemental note for
some lower level conditions for the case of testing procedures based on Lee, Song, and
Whang (2018). In this case, F sij,∞ is a standard normal CDF.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumption 4.1 holds, and that g(L) → ∞ and g(L)/rL → 0
as L→∞. Then, for any ε > 0, along a sequence of probabilities PL from P0,ε,
PL{Kˆ = K0} → 1, as L→∞,
and the estimated group structure TˆKˆ satisfies that as L→∞,
PL{TˆKˆ = T} → 1.
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Table 1: Group Structure in Experiments
Structure n K0 nk
S1 12 2 6
S2 12 4 3
S3 40 2 20
S4 40 4 10
Note: n denotes the total number of the bidders; K0 denotes the number of the groups; nk
denotes the number of actual bidders from group k. For each structure in the simulation design,
groups all have the same number of bidders.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 proceeds in two steps. First, we show that TˆK0 is consistent
for T . Second, we show that Kˆ is consistent for K0. To see the intuition for this second
step, note that when K ≥ K0, the component Vˆ (K) is OP (1), and when K < K0, the
component Vˆ (K) diverges at a rate faster than g(L). From this, we obtain that Kˆ is
consistent for K0.
5. Monte Carlo Simulations
5.1. Finite Sample Performance of the Classification
We use a model of a first-price procurement auction with asymmetric independent
private costs to study performance of our classification procedure. (See Appendix B.1 of
the supplemental note.) Bidders are classified into K0 groups. We abstract away from the
formation of equilibrium strategies, and draw bids from a normal distribution N(µk, σ2).
Let L denote the number of auctions in which any given pair of bidders participates. We
consider two specifications of µk’s. In one specification, µ1 = 2.0, µ2 = 2.6, µ3 = 3.2, and
µ4 = 3.8 with increment Dµ = 0.6, and in the other specification, µ1 = 2.0, µ2 = 2.2, µ3 =
2.4, and µ4 = 2.6 with increment Dµ = 0.2. The variance σ2 is taken to be 0.25.
Table 1 summarizes the designs of group structures in our simulation. The first two
structures involve a total of 12 bidders and the last two 40 bidders. The first and third
are designed to be coarser group structures than the second and fourth respectively. We
construct p-values using the procedure in Section 4.3 and obtain group classification from
500 simulated samples. For each estimate, we used 200 bootstrap iterations to calculate
p-values.
To evaluate the performance of our classification method, we define a measure of dis-
crepancy between two ordered partitions T1 and T2:
δ (T1, T2) =
1
K1
K1∑
k=1
min
1≤j≤K2
|N1k4N2j |,(5.1)
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Table 2: Performance of the Classification with One Group (K0 = 1 and unknown)
n L Kˆ0 EAD HAD(.10) HAD(.25) HAD(.50)
12 400 1.002 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000
12 200 1.003 0.014 0.002 0.000 0.000
12 100 1.003 0.018 0.002 0.001 0.000
40 400 1.003 0.082 0.005 0.003 0
40 200 1.006 0.084 0.008 0.002 0
40 100 1.008 0.096 0.010 0.004 0
Note: n is the number of bidders in data; and L the number of markets. Kˆ0 is the average number of
estimated groups in 500 simulation samples. EAD is the average number of mismatched bidders across
true groups and simulated samples. HAD(λ) is the hazard rate of average discrepancy. For example,
HAD(.10) = 0.002 means that in 499 simulated samples (out of a total of 500) the average number of
mismatched bidders is less than 10 percent of the total number of bidders.
Table 3: Performance of the Classification with Multiple Groups (K0 ≥ 2 and unknown)
K0 = 2 K0 = 4
n L Dµ Kˆ0 EAD HAD(.25) HAD(.75) Kˆ0 EAD HAD(.25) HAD(.75)
12 400 0.6 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 3.96 0.03 0.01 0.00
12 400 0.2 2.00 0.01 0.00 0.000 3.94 0.04 0.03 0.00
12 100 0.6 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 3.98 0.01 0.01 0.00
12 100 0.2 2.03 0.52 0.07 0.004 3.24 1.53 0.24 0.00
40 400 0.6 2.00 0.01 0.00 0.000 3.97 0.08 0.02 0.00
40 400 0.2 2.01 0.01 0.00 0.000 3.83 0.43 0.09 0.00
40 100 0.6 2.01 0.01 0.00 0.000 3.95 0.13 0.03 0.00
40 100 0.2 2.18 1.91 0.02 0.000 3.06 1.93 0.49 0.11
Note: Kˆ0, EAD and HAD(λ) are defined as in Table 2. Dµ is the difference between group means µ1 and
µ2. Conditional on the number of markets (L) and the number of bidders in population (n), the
classification task is harder when the difference between group means Dµ is smaller.
where T1 = (N11 , ..., N
1
K1
) and T2 = (N21 , ..., N
2
K2
) are ordered partitions of N and 4
denotes set-difference. We evaluate our classification method using two criterion: (1)
Expected Average Discrepancy (EAD) defined as E(δ(T, TˆKˆ)) and (2) the hazard rate of
EAD, i.e., HAD(λ) ≡ P{δ(T, TˆKˆ) > λn} for 0 < λ < 1.
Table 2 reports estimates when there is no unobserved heterogeneity among bidders
(K0 = 1). In this case, our procedure detects the absence of unobserved heterogeneity
effectively. For a given n, there is a moderate increase in the accuracy of classification as
L increases, both in terms of EAD and HAD(λ).
Table 3 reports results for K0 = 2 and K0 = 4. In both cases, the estimates for K0 are
mostly correct. Estimation accuracy increases with the difference between group means.
For a given number of groups, the performance in terms of EAD and HAD are both better
with greater group differences and larger sample sizes.
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Misclassification errors tend to arise less often when the number of true groups is
smaller, with the exception of Dµ = 0.2 and L = 100. Intuitively, this is because when
the set of bidders is partitioned into fewer groups, we can use pairwise inequalities for
classification.
5.2. Two-Step Estimation in a Structural Model
In this section we use a simple structural model of procurement auctions to investigate
the impact of classification errors on subsequent estimation of structural parameters. A
set ofN providers (bidders) is partitioned intoK0 groups, each with a distinct distribution
of private costs. Let Nk denote the set of providers in N with type k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K0}, and
let |Nk| denote its cardinality. The cost for a provider i with type τ(i) ∈ {1, 2, ..., K0} is
given by ci,l = µτ(i) + i,l, where i,l follows N(0, σ) with the support [c, c¯].14
Auction participants are determined in two steps. First, two out of K0 groups, τl,1
and τl,2, are chosen at random. Next, n1 and n2 providers are randomly drawn from the
corresponding groups Nτl,1 and Nτl,2 and their costs were constructed as above. Here
n1 and n2 denote the numbers of actual participants (those who submitted bids in the
auction). Then participants bid based on their realized costs. The participant with the
lowest bid wins. The identity of each participant and its bid are both reported in data. We
consider two specifications: (S1) with K0 = 4, |Nk| = 4 for all k, and (S2) with K0 = 4,
|Nk| = 10 for all k. For both specifications, we set µ = (2, 2.4, 2.8, 3.2) and σ = 0.5. We
run the following four experiments with different specification and sample sizes: (A) S1,
L = 200; (B) S2, L = 200; (C) S1, L = 400; and (D) S2, L = 400. We set n1 = 1 and
n2 = 1 so that each auction has 2 actual participants chosen from K0 different types.
Structural parameters K0, τ(·), θ = {(µk)K0k=1, σ} are estimated via two steps. First,
the group structure (τˆ(·) and Kˆ) are estimated using our classification algorithm. Next,
we apply GMM to estimate the remaining structural parameters using the following mo-
ments for k = 1, ..., K0: (1) within-group means of bids:
∑n
i=1E[Bi,l−µB,k(θ; I)]1{τˆ(i) =
k} = 0; and (2) within-group second moment of bids: ∑ni=1E[B2i,l − (µB,k(θ; I)2 +
σB,k(θ; I)
2)]1{τˆ(i) = k} = 0, where µB,k(θ; I) and σB,k(θ; I) denote the mean and stan-
dard deviation of equilibrium bid distribution for bidders from group k, θ the vector of
parameters and I the profile of participant types. Standard errors are computed from the
analytic expression for the covariance matrix in asymptotic distribution.
To compute µB,k(θ0; I) and σB,k(θ0; I) for a given θ0 and profile of participant types I =
(τl,1, τl,2, n1, n2) we simulate the equilibrium bidding functions.15 The bidding functions
14We set the upper and lower bounds of costs to c = 1K0
∑
k(µk − 1.96× σ) and c¯ = 1K0
∑
k(µk + 1.96× σ).
True parameters are chosen so that c is strictly positive.
15 Specifically, we start from the analytical bidding function when all participants belong to the same group,
and use a modified version of the numerical method in Marshall, Meurer, Richard, and Stromquist (1994)
21
Table 4: Simulation Results from Specifications A and B
µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 σ
Spec A Using True Groups
Rej. Prob. 0.0150 0.0515 0.0523 0.0546 0.0149
Bias -0.0189 -0.0252 -0.0610 -0.0511 0.0242
MSE 0.0005 0.0008 0.0035 0.0039 0.0039
Using Est’d Groups
Rej. Prob. 0.0148 0.0542 0.0510 0.0485 0.0151
Bias 0.0059 0.0329 -0.0241 -0.0225 -0.0549
MSE 0.0041 0.0083 0.0035 0.0027 0.0383
Spec B Using True Groups
Rej. Prob. 0.0120 0.0515 0.0512 0.0514 0.0111
Bias -0.0211 -0.0233 -0.0621 -0.0622 0.0236
MSE 0.0005 0.0007 0.0039 0.0039 0.0034
Using Est’d Groups
Rej. Prob. 0.0131 0.0550 0.0540 0.0530 0.0160
Bias -0.0213 -0.0218 -0.0763 -0.0765 0.0211
MSE 0.0004 0.0015 0.0411 0.0441 0.0023
Note: Specification A uses K0 = 4, nk = 4, and L = 200 and Specification B uses K0 = 4, nk = 10, and
L = 200. Here nk is the number of bidders in group k, and L the number of markets. The rejection
probabilities are from t-tests for the individual parameters. The nominal rejection probability is set to
0.05.
are then combined with the cost distributions implied by a vector of trial parameters, θ0,
to obtain the distribution of bids: FB,k(b| θ0, I) = FC,k(β−1k (b)| θ0). Here FC,k(.| θ0) denotes
the distribution of project’s cost for a bidder belonging to group k which is corresponds
to a parameter vector θ0 and βk(c), β−1k (b) are the bid and the inverse bid functions
used by such bidder. We then compute the mean and the standard deviation of this bid
distribution.
Tables 4 and 5 report the bias and mean squared errors (MSEs) of two estimators for
(µk)
K0
k=1 and σ. The first is an “infeasible” estimator that uses the knowledge of the true
group structure. The second is the two-step estimator we propose, which requires bidder
classification in the first step. These two tables also report the rejection probabilities from
t-tests of individual parameters.
Table 4 reports results for a smaller sample with L = 200. The rejection probabilities
are close to the nominal rejection rate 0.05, except for parameters µ1 and σ. The MSE
and bias for all parameters are reasonably small. Table 4 also shows that the rejection
probabilities for the infeasible estimator using the true groups and those for the actual
estimator using the estimated groups are very similar. There is some minor difference
to solve for bidding strategies in the presence of multiple groups. We impose a sample version of c and c¯
by replacing σ with its sample analog.
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Table 5: Simulation Results from Specifications C and D
µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 σ
Spec C Using True Groups
Rej. Prob. 0.0149 0.0500 0.0513 0.0520 0.0149
Bias -0.0214 -0.0222 -0.0615 -0.0713 0.0237
MSE 0.0005 0.0007 0.0039 0.0039 0.0006
Using Est’d Groups
Rej. Prob. 0.0151 0.0485 0.0526 0.0545 0.0151
Bias 0.0131 0.0412 -0.0625 -0.0656 -0.0241
MSE 0.0060 0.0008 0.0053 0.0031 0.0054
Spec D Using True Groups
Rej. Prob. 0.0133 0.0480 0.0510 0.0520 0.0108
Bias -0.0227 -0.0219 -0.0611 -0.0231 0.0236
MSE 0.0005 0.0007 0.0039 0.0039 0.0006
Using Est’d Groups
Rej. Prob. 0.0126 0.0498 0.0520 0.0520 0.0128
Bias -0.0229 -0.0123 -0.0761 -0.0361 0.0098
MSE 0.0093 0.0056 0.0068 0.0061 0.0007
Note: Specification C uses K0 = 4, nk = 4, and L = 400, and Specification D, K0 = 4, nk = 10, and
L = 400. Here nk is the number of bidders in group k and L the number of markets. The nominal
rejection probability is set to 0.05.
between these two estimators in the MSE of some group means. The discrepancy seems
more pronounced when the size of each group is increased from |Nk| = 4 to |Nk| = 10.
Table 5 reports the same results for larger samples with L = 400. The performance
of the estimators improves slightly relative to Table 4. Again, the rejection probabilities
for the two estimators are similar. There is also evidence that with a larger number of
the markets, our classification method performs better given the same number of within-
group bidders. Overall, Table 4 and 5 provide simulation evidence that the classification
errors in the first-step do not have any major impact on the finite sample performance of
the two-step estimators for structural parameters.
6. Empirical Application: California Market for Highway Pro-
curement
We apply our methodology to analyze procurement auctions conducted by the Cali-
fornia Department of Transportation (CalTrans) to allocate projects for highway repair
work. Our goal is to demonstrate the performance of our method in the empirical set-
ting, and to highlight the consequences of ignoring agent unobserved heterogeneity in
estimation.
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Model. We follow the literature in modeling the auction market so that each project at-
tracts a set of potential bidders who decide whether to participate in the auction and,
if deciding to participate, choose a bid to submit. Our main innovation is to allow for
contractors participating in this market to differ in a way that is not observed by the re-
searcher. Specifically, each contractor is characterized by a contractor-specific cost factor
(invariant across projects) qi which takes discrete values in {q¯0, q¯1, ..., q¯K0}. This un-
observed cost factor captures the difference in cost efficiencies across firms generated
perhaps by the differences in managerial ability or other factors associated with the firm
organization. As in our basic set up this cost factor induces partitioning of the population
of firms participating in this market into the groups: N = ∪K0k=1Nk with Nk = {i : qi = q¯k}
and so that τ(i) = k if and only if i ∈ Nk.
Following the convention in the empirical auction literature, we assume that each
project l auctioned in this market is summarized by a set of observable characteristics
Xl and an unobservable factor Ul. The latter is distributed according to normal distribu-
tion with mean zero and standard deviation σU . The set of firms which are potentially
interested in project l (potential bidders), denoted here by Sl, is exogenously drawn from
N . A contractor i that is a potential bidder for project l is characterized by private entry
costs, Ei,l, and the private cost of completing the project, Ci,l. We assume that private
costs vary independently across bidders and auctions. The entry costs additionally are in-
dependent of Ul, and are distributed according to the exponential distribution with a rate
parameter λi,l. The costs of completing the work are drawn from a log normal distribu-
tion with mean µi,l and standard deviation σC . The mean of the cost distribution depends
on project characteristics including the distance between the project and the bidder’s lo-
cations, Di,l, as well as an unobserved cost factor qi.16,17 Reflecting these features, we
set
µi,l = Xlα1 +Di,lα2 +
K0∑
k=1
q¯k1{τ(i) = k}+ Ul, and λi,l = Xlγ1 +
K∑
k=1
q˜k1{τ(i) = k}.
16The groups reflect differences in the contractors’ cost efficiencies related to the project work. While entry
costs may also vary across groups, there is no reason for the group differences in project costs to coincide
with the group differences in entry costs. For this reason, we explicitly distinguish between the parameters
capturing the former (q¯k) and the latter (q˜k) effects.
17 Following the literature, we distinguish between the bidders who regularly participate in the procure-
ment market (regular bidders) and those who only appear in a very small number of auctions (fringe
bidders). We assume that all fringe bidders are associated with the same fixed level of the unobserved cost
factor q¯0.
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A potential bidder decides to participate in the auction for project l if his ex-ante expected
profit conditional on participation exceeds entry costs.18 A bidder who decides to partici-
pate observes realization of his costs and the identities of other contractors who decided
to participate. He chooses a bid to maximize his interium profit which reflects probability
of winning the project conditional on his costs draw and the set of competitors. We as-
sume that the observed outcomes reflect a type-symmetric pure-strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (psBNE).19
Estimation Details. The estimation methodology consists of two steps. In the first step
we use the pairwise comparison indexes to recover the unobserved group structure. In the
second step the parameters of the model are estimated through a GMM procedure while
imposing the group structure recovered in the first step. We assume bids are rationalized
by a single equilibrium.
In the first step we use the pairwise comparison indexes derived in Appendix B.1 in
the supplemental note to recover the unobserved group structure.20 Specifically, in ac-
cordance with the notation used in the paper, we define δij ≡
∫
max {rij(b), 0} db and
δ0ij ≡
∫ |rij(b)|db with rij(b) = Gji(b| d) − Gij(b|d) and Gij(b|d) = P{Bi,l ≥ b|Di,l =
d, Dj,l = d, i ∈ Al, j ∈ Al}.21 We obtain empirical counterparts of these indexes by re-
placing Gij(b|d) with its sample analog Gˆij(b|d). We implement classification using the
bootstrap testing procedure described previously.
In the second stage, we consider the following moments: (a) the first and the second
moment of bid distribution for a given level of d and for a given group of bidders; (b) the
covariance between bids and the observable project characteristics; (c) the covariance
between any two bids submitted in the same auction; (d) the expected number of partici-
pants in any given auction for every (d, q)-group; (e) the covariance between the number
18The expected profit reflects his expectation over the participation decisions of other potential bidders,
the expectation over his costs of completing the project, and reflects expected probability of winning the
project which depends on the costs draws of his competitors.
19In such an equilibrium, participants who are ex ante identical in an auction l (i.e. i, j ∈ Sl such that
qi = qj , and Di,l = Dj,l) adopt the same strategies.
20The pairwise comparison indexes are derived using Corollary 3 of Lebrun (1999) which forGij(b) defined
as P{Bi,l ≥ b| i, j ∈ Sl} establishes that Gij(b) ≤ Gji(b) for all b in the common support of Bi,l and Bj,l
whenever τ(i) ≤ τ(j). The inequality holds strictly at least over some interval with positive Lebesgue
measure and holds unconditionally when aggregated over bidder identities and auction characteristics.
21We recover group structure on the basis of the indexes which aggregate over the values of the distance
d. As a robustness check we also compute groupings on the basis of subsets of distances. We find that the
results of classification are very similar across these approaches.
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of participants and the observable project characteristics. We search for the set of param-
eters which minimizes the distance between the empirical and theoretical counterparts
of these moments subject to participation constraints.22
Estimation Results. We implement the analysis using the data for California Highway
Procurement projects auctioned between 2002 and 2012. The projects in our sample are
worth $523,000 and last for around three months on average; 38% of these projects are
partially supported through federal funds. There are 25 firms that participate regularly
in this market. The other firms are referred to as “fringes”. An average auction attracts
six regular potential bidders and eight fringe bidders. Since only a fraction of potential
bidders submits bids, an entry decision plays an important role in this market. Finally,
the distance to the company location varies quite a bit and is around 28 miles on average
for regular potential bidders.
In the first step, we obtain through our classification method the grouping of the bid-
ders into eight groups that consist of 2, 3, 8, 3, 2, 3, 2 and 2 bidders respectively. The
parameter estimates obtained in the second stage of our estimation procedure and their
standard errors are summarized in Table 6. We normalize bids by the engineer’s esti-
mate in the estimation. Therefore all the parameters measure the effects relative to the
project size. The first two columns present the estimates which are obtained when the
unobserved group structure is taken into account in the estimation. The results indicate
significant differences in bidders’ costs across the groups. Specifically, fringe bidders (the
reference group) tend to have the highest costs whereas the difference in costs between
the group of fringe bidders and the groups of regular bidders is comparable in impact to
the shortening of the distance to the project site by 42.5 (i.e., by 0.051/0.0012), 10.1,
26.67, 48.33, 11.67, 6.67, 7.5, and 41.67 miles respectively.23 The distance increases
project costs (additional 8.33 miles result in costs which are 1% higher on average).24
The entry costs of regular bidders are significantly lower than entry costs of fringe bid-
ders. However, they appear to be quite similar across the groups of regular bidders.
The last two columns of Table 6 show the parameter estimates under the specification
when the unobserved group structure of the regular bidders is ignored in the estimation.
The parameter estimates are obtained by the GMM estimation procedure using the same
22We do not explicitly solve for participation strategies. Instead, we discretize the support of auction
characteristics (Xl, Ul) and treat the probabilities of participation for bidders of various (q, d)−types cor-
responding to these grid values as auxiliary parameters. We follow the spirit of Dube, Fox, and Su (2012)
by maximizing a moment-based objective function subject to the constraints that the optimality of the
participation strategies is satisfied on the grid of the project characteristics’ values.
23The estimates of the group-specific fixed effects are omitted for brevity. The full table that contains these
estimates is found in the supplemental note to the paper.
24Recall that the coefficients reflect the impact on costs in terms of the fraction of the engineer’s estimate.
The distance resulting in 0.01 increase of average costs can thus be computed as 0.01/0.012.
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Table 6. Parameter Estimates
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
The Distribution of Project Costs
Constant (q¯0) 0.127∗∗∗ (0.0129) 0.113∗∗∗ (0.0119)
Eng. Estimate -0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0002) -0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Duration 0.00026∗ (0.00036) 0.00022∗ (0.00027)
Distance 0.0012∗∗∗ (0.00022) 0.00086∗∗∗ (0.00019)
Bridge -0.0092∗∗∗ (0.0018) -0.012∗∗∗ (0.0011)
Federal Aid -0.043∗∗∗ (0.0103) -0.078∗∗∗ (0.009)
Regular Bidder -0.035∗∗∗ (0.003)
σC 0.087∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.112∗∗∗ (0.022)
σU 0.021∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.0207∗∗∗ (0.008)
The Distribution of Entry Costs
Constant (q˜0) -0.0114∗ (0.0078) -0.0161∗ 0.0091
Eng. Estimate 0.0055∗∗∗ (0.0016) 0.0051∗∗∗ (0.0012)
Number of Items 0.0018∗ (0.0011) 0.0011∗∗∗ (0.0005)
Regular Bidder -0.022 ∗∗∗ (0.004)
Note: In the results above the distance is measured in miles. The fringe bidders are the reference group.
The first two columns correspond to the specification which allows for the unobserved bidder
heterogeneity; the last two columns correspond to the specification without unobserved bidder
heterogeneity. The results are based on the data for 1,054 medium-sized projects that involve paving and
bridge work. Standard errors are computed using bootstrap.
set of moments by imposing that only two groups of sellers are present in the data: fringe
and regular bidders. Under this specification, the cost reduction due to the federal aid
is estimated to be much higher (7.8% rather than 4.3%), the impact of the distance is
estimated to be lower (the distance to the project has to be 11.67 miles higher in order
to increase the average cost by 1%). Additionally, the entry costs are estimated to be
lower relative to the baseline specification. Our results thus confirm that regular partic-
ipants in the highway procurement market are characterized by important unobserved
cost differences that persist in the data.
7. Conclusion
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, for models with
strategic interdependence between multiple agents, we develop a method to classify these
agents based on their discrete unobserved individual heterogeneity, using pairwise in-
equalities implied by an economic model. Second, we show such pairwise inequalities
arise in a number of game-theoretical settings where identification of model primitives is
challenging. Third, we propose a computationally feasible method which consistently es-
timates the group structure defined by unobserved heterogeneity. We apply this method
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to California highway procurement data to show that unobserved bidder heterogeneity
plays an important role in this procurement market.
The classification method proposed in this paper is especially useful in settings where
the analysis of unobserved individual heterogeneity is complicated by the presence of
strategic interdependence in the model. We offer new insights into the identification and
estimation of such models. Specifically, classification could be used as a first step in the
structural studies of many environments where analyses would otherwise be infeasible
due to the identification or computational challenges.
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Appendix A. Introduction
This note is a supplemental note to Krasnokutskaya, Song, and Tang (2019). It consists
of five parts. Appendix B gives details about how to derive pairwise comparison index
in examples of first-price and English auctions where bidders have asymmetric private
values, or collusive behavior. Appendix C gives mathematical proofs of the results in the
paper, and provide lower level conditions. Appendix D discusses a bootstrap method to
construct a confidence set for the group structure. Appendix E presents further simulation
results regarding the performance of our classification algorithm proposed in Krasnokut-
skaya, Song, and Tang (2019), and Appendix F reports summary statistics for the data
used in the empirical application in the paper and some further results.
Appendix B. Bidders with Asymmetric Values or Collusive Behavior
B.1. First-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
Let the population of bidders, N , be partitioned into K0 groups, each of which is
characterized by a distinct distribution of private values Fk(·). To fix ideas, assume that
Fk(·) has the same shape of distribution, but differs only in their location (means) q¯1 <
q¯2 < ... < q¯K0, with q¯k being the mean of Fk. (Our method applies in a more general
setting when Fk’s are stochastically ordered.) In this case, for a bidder i with τ(i) = k
the mean of the private value distribution is given by qi = q¯k. Let Sl denote the set of
participants in auction l and Bl = {Bi,l} a vector of bids. In a type-symmetric equilibrium
Bi,l = βk(Vi,l) if τ(i) = k, with βk(·) being a bidding strategy and Vi,l the private value for
i in auction l. Define Gij(b) = P{Bi,l ≤ b| i, j ∈ Sl}, where Sl denotes the set of bidders
in auction l. We assume bids are rationalized by a single equilibrium.
Corollary 3 of Lebrun (1999) showed that Gij(b) ≥ Gji(b) for all b in the common sup-
port of Bi,l and Bj,l whenever τ(i) ≤ τ(j). The inequality holds strictly at least over some
interval with positive Lebesgue measure. This inequality holds unconditionally when ag-
gregated over bidder identities and auction characteristics.25 Thus pairwise comparison
25A similar property holds in the settings where allocations are implemented through first-price procure-
ment auctions. The only difference is that in these settings Gij(b) should be defined as Gij(b) = P{Bi,l ≥
b| i, j ∈ Sl}.
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indexes can be constructed as follows:
δij ≡
∫
max {Gji(b)−Gij(b), 0} db.(B.1)
Likewise, define δ0ij by replacing the integrand in δij by the absolute value of Gij(b) −
Gji(b). These indexes do not condition on the specific identities of bidders participating
in each auction l. Thus it allows us to utilize observations from a large number of auctions
when constructing a comparison index for any generic pair i and j.
For the rest of this subsection, we derive the pairwise comparison inequalities in a
general model of asymmetric first-price auctions where independent private values are
drawn from distributions that are stochastically ordered. That is, Fk′ first-order stochas-
tically dominates Fk whenever k′ > k. Also assume that the ordering of the distributions
is strict (F1(v) > F2(v) > ... > FK0(v)) at least for v within some non-degenerate interval
on the support. Let N(k) denote the set of all agents in group k.
For simplicity, suppose that a bidder from group k becomes active with a fixed probabil-
ity that is exogenously given. Let A denote the set of entrants in a given auction and λ(A)
denote the structure, or the profile, of entrants. That is, λ(A) is a K0-vector of integers
(|A(1)|, ..., |A(K0)|), with A(k) being the set of entrants from group k. An entrant i submits
bid Bi according to his private value vi, taking into account the competitive structure of
an auction λ(A) which he observes at the time of bidding. Across auctions in the data, A
and {vi}i∈A are independent draws from the same population distribution.
Let Gk(·;λ) be the distribution of Bi when i ∈ N(k). The private values are independent
of λA under exogenous entry. Part (i) of Corollary 3 in Lebrun (1999) showed that, given
any realization of λ(A), the supremum of the support of bids is the same for all bidder
types. That is, for any λ, β1(v|λ) = β2(v|λ) = ... = βK(v|λ) ≡ η(λ) < ∞ for some
η(λ) ∈ (v, v), where βk denotes the equilibrium bidding strategy for a bidder from group
k. Furthermore, the corollary also showed that for any λ(A),
Fk′(β
−1
k′ (b|λ(A))) ≤ Fk(β−1k (b|λ(A))),
for all b ∈ [v, η(λ(A))] and k < k′, and the inequality holds strictly at least over some
interval on [v, η(λ(A))]. Consider i ∈ N(k′) and j ∈ N(k) with k′ > k. It then follows that
P {Bi ≤ b|i, j ∈ A} =
∑
λ(A)
Fk′(β
−1
k′ (b|λ(A)))P{λ(A)|i, j ∈ A}
≤
∑
λ(A)
Fk(β
−1
k (b|λ(A)))P{λ(A)|i, j ∈ A} = P{Bj ≤ b|i, j ∈ A},
with the inequality holding strictly over some non-degenerate interval in the shared bid
support. The inequality does not condition on the identities of the entrants other than i
and j.
Finally, note that by a symmetric argument, a similar inequality holds in first-price
procurement auctions with P {Bi ≥ b|i, j ∈ A} ≤ P{Bj ≥ b|i, j ∈ A} (with inequality
being strict over some non-degenerate interval in the shared bid support), whenever the
private cost distribution for i is stochastically lower than that of j.
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B.2. English Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
Consider the setting in Section B.1, except that the auction format is English (ascend-
ing). The data report the identities of entrants in A and the transaction price W in each
auction. In a dominant strategy equilibrium, the price in an auction equals the second
highest private value among all entrants.
With independent private values, we show below that
(B.2) P{W ≤ w|i ∈ A, j 6∈ A} ≤ P{W ≤ w|j ∈ A, i 6∈ A},
for all w over the intersection of support, whenever τ(i) > τ(j). Furthermore, the in-
equality holds strictly for some w over a set of positive measure in common support. This
implies
(B.3) E[W |i ∈ A, j 6∈ A] > E[W |j ∈ A, i 6∈ A].
The intuition behind (B.2) is as follows. Given any structure of entrants who compete
with i or j (but not both), the distribution of the transaction price is stochastically higher
when i is present but j is not than when j is present but i is not. Loosely speaking,
when j is replaced by the stronger type i in the set of entrants, the overall profile of
value distributions becomes “stochastically higher”. Then the law of iterated expectations
implies (B.2) and (B.3).
To infer the group structure, define the following indexes:
δij = max{E[W |i ∈ A, j 6∈ A]− E[W |j ∈ A, i 6∈ A], 0}, and
δ0ij = |E[W |i ∈ A, j 6∈ A]− E[W |j ∈ A, i 6∈ A]| .
One can then use our procedure proposed in the main text to classify the bidders based
on pairwise comparison.
We now derive (B.2) formally. Let Vi denote the private value for bidder i. Consider
the case where i ∈ N(k′) and j ∈ N(k) with k′ > k. Let λ(A) denote the K0-vector of
integers that summarizes the group structure of the set of entrants A. Let 1k denote the
unit vector with the k-th component being 1. Then define
Hj,i(w;λ
∗) ≡ P{W ≤ w|j ∈ A, i 6∈ A, λ(A\{j}) = λ∗}
= P
{
max
s∈A
Vs ≤ w
∣∣∣∣λ(A) = λ∗ + 1k}
+P
{
max
s∈A
Vs > w,W ≤ w
∣∣∣∣λ(A) = λ∗ + 1k} ,
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where the first term on the right-hand side equals Fk(w)
(∏K0
l=1 Fl(w)
λ∗l
)
, and the second
on the right-hand side is
P
{
max
s∈A\{j}
Vs ≤ w, Vj > w
∣∣∣∣λ(A\{j}) = λ∗}
+P
{
Vj ≤ w, max
s∈A\{j}
Vs > w
∣∣∣∣λ(A\{j}) = λ∗}
= [1− Fk(w)]
(∏K0
l=1
Fl(w)
λ∗l
)
+ Fk(w)ϕ(w;λ
∗),
where ϕ(w;λ∗) denotes the probability that the maximum value in A\{j} is strictly
greater than w while the second highest value in A\{j} is less than or equal to w condi-
tional on the classification λ(A\{j}) = λ∗. Therefore
Hj,i(w;λ
∗) =
(∏K0
l=1
Fl(w)
λ∗l
)
+ Fk(w)ϕ(w;λ
∗).
By the same argument,
Hi,j(w;λ
∗) ≡ P{W ≤ w|i ∈ A, j 6∈ A, λ(A\{i}) = λ∗}
=
(∏K0
l=1
Fl(w)
λ∗l
)
+ Fk′(w)ϕ(w;λ
∗).
It is then straightforward to show that for any λ∗, that Fk′ F.S.D. Fk implies Hi,j(w;λ∗) ≤
Hj,i(w;λ
∗) over the union of the K0 supports of {Fl : 1 ≤ l ≤ K0}, and the inequality
holds strictly at least for some w in an interval on the intersection of the K0 supports of
{Fl : 1 ≤ l ≤ K0}. Under exogenous entry, we get
P{W ≤ w|i ∈ A, j 6∈ A} ≤ P{W ≤ w|j ∈ A, i 6∈ A},
after integrating out λ∗. The inequality holds strictly for some w over common support.
One may wonder whether we can recover the classification of bidders in the English
auction example through a “global” approach when the identity of the winner is reported
in the data. That is, by comparing the distribution of transaction prices when i is the
winner versus that when j is the winner, as opposed to the pairwise comparison approach
proposed above. Let us explain why this is not feasible.
For any i ∈ N(k′) and j ∈ N(k) and Fk′ F.S.D. Fk, let A\{i, j} denote the set of entrants
out of N\{i, j} and let M(A\{i, j}) ≡ max{Vs : s ∈ A\{i, j}}. Let φ(w;λ∗) denote the
distribution of M(A\{i, j}) conditional on λ(A\{i, j}) = λ∗. Let D denote the identity of
the winner in the auction; and Sk denote the survival function for the private value of a
type-k bidder. Then,
P {W ≤ w,D = i|i ∈ A}
= pjP{W ≤ w,D = i|i, j ∈ A}+ (1− pj)P {W ≤ w,D = i|i ∈ A, j 6∈ A} ,
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where pj is shorthand for j’s entry probability. Also note that, by construction, once
conditioned on the realized set of entrants from A\{i, j}, we have
P {W ≤ w,D = i|i, j ∈ A, λ(A\{i, j}) = λ∗}
=
∫ w
−∞
Fk(t)φ(t;λ
∗)dFk′(t) + Sk′(w)Fk(w)φ(w;λ∗),
and
P {W ≤ w,D = i|i ∈ A, j 6∈ A, λ(A\{i, j}) = λ∗}
=
∫ w
−∞
φ(t;λ∗)dFk′(t) + Sk′(w)φ(w;λ∗).
Likewise P{W ≤ w,D = j|j ∈ A} can be written by swapping the roles of i and j and
swapping the roles of k and k′ respectively. Then it can be shown that
(B.4) P{W ≤ w,D = i|i ∈ A, j ∈ A} > P{W ≤ w,D = j|i ∈ A, j ∈ A}.26
To see why the inequality in (B.4) holds, note for any λ∗,
P{W ≤ w,D = i|i, j ∈ A, λ(A\{i, j}) = λ∗}
−P{W ≤ w,D = j|i, j ∈ A, λ(A\{i, j}) = λ∗},
where the difference is written as[∫ w
−∞
Fk(t)φ(t;λ
∗)dFk′(t)−
∫ w
−∞
Fk′(t)φ(t;λ
∗)dFk(t)
]
+φ(w;λ∗) [Sk′(w)Fk(w)− Sk(w)Fk′(w)] .
The first square bracket in the display above is positive because∫ w
−∞
Fk(t)φ(t;λ
∗)dFk′(t) >
∫ w
−∞
Fk′(t)φ(t;λ
∗)dFk′(t) >
∫ w
−∞
Fk′(t)φ(t;λ
∗)dFk(t).
Furthermore, the second square bracket in the display is also positive because “Fk′ F.S.D.
Fk” implies
Sk′(w) ≥ Sk(w) and Fk(w) ≥ Fk′(w) for all w
and these inequalities hold strictly for some set of w with positive measure. Integrating
out λ∗ on both sides of the inequality
P{W ≤ w,D = i|i, j ∈ A, λ(A\{i, j}) = λ∗}
> P{W ≤ w,D = j|i, j ∈ A, λ(A\{i, j}) = λ∗},
yields the first inequality in (B.4).
Similarly, the difference between P{W ≤ w,D = i|i ∈ A, j 6∈ A, λ(A\{i, j}) = λ∗} and
P{W ≤ w,D = j|j ∈ A, i 6∈ A, λ(A\{i, j}) = λ∗} equals[∫ w
−∞
φ(t;λ∗)dFk′(t)−
∫ w
−∞
φ(t;λ∗)dFk(t)
]
+ φ(w;λ∗)[Sk′(w)− Sk(w)]
which must be positive because the two terms in the square brackets are positive.
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Now we write
P{W ≤ w,D = i|i ∈ A}(B.5)
= pjP{W ≤ w,D = i|i, j ∈ A}+ (1− pj)P{W ≤ w,D = i|i ∈ A, j 6∈ A}
where pj ≡ P (j ∈ A). A similar expression exists for P{W ≤ w,D = j|j ∈ A} by
swapping the roles of i and j in (B.5). Therefore the difference between P{W ≤ w,D =
i|i ∈ A} and P{W ≤ w,D = j|j ∈ A} is also indeterminate in the absence of knowledge
about pi, pj.
B.3. Bidding Cartel in First-Price Procurement Auctions
Our method can be used to detect the identities of cartel members in a model of first-
price procurement auctions in which a bidding cartel competes with competitive non-
colluding bidders (Pesendorfer (2000)). Let the population of bidders/firms N be parti-
tioned into a set of colluding firmsN(c) and non-colluding firmsN(nc). In each auction, the
set of potential bidders (who are interested in bidding for the contract) A is partitioned
into A(c) and A(nc). The cardinality of A(c) is common knowledge among the bidders. The
potential bidders in A(c) collude by refraining from participation except for one bidder i∗
who is chosen among them to submit a bid.27
In an efficient truth-revealing mechanism considered in Pesendorfer (2000), the cartel
member that has the lowest cost is selected to be the sole bidder from the cartel. That is,
i∗(A(c)) = arg minj∈A(c) Cj where Cj is the private cost of bidder j. Thus, the set of final
entrants who are observed to submit bids in the data is A∗ ≡ {i∗(A(c))} ∪ A(nc). (The set
of colluding potential bidders is not reported in the data available to the researcher.)
We maintain that across the auctions in the data bidders’ private costs are independent
draws from the same distribution. Bidders are ex ante symmetric in that each bidder’s
private cost is drawn independently from the same distribution. Entrants know that
a representative of the cartel is participating in bidding, and all follow Bayesian Nash
equilibrium bidding strategies.
We are interested in detecting the identities of the set of colluding firms in N(c) from
the reported bidding and participation decisions. Let N ′(c) ⊂ N denote the set of bidders
such that no two bidders in N ′(c) are ever observed to compete with each other in the
bidding stage. By construction, N(c) ⊆ N ′(c) so the latter should be interpreted as a
set of suspects for collusion. However, the set N ′(c) could also contain innocent non-
colluding bidders who are never observed to compete with each other in the data because
of random entry in finite sample. Our goal is to use bidding data to separate N(c) from
N ′(c)\N(c) ≡ N(nc) ∩N ′(c).
Pesendorfer (2000) (Remark 3) shows that in any given auction with participants
A(c) ∪ A(nc), the distribution of bids from a non-colluding bidder j first-order stochas-
tically dominates the distribution of the bids from the sole bidder representing the cartel
27The cartel is sustained through side payments among its members.
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i∗.28 Specifically, for any such i∗ and j,
(B.6) P{Bi∗ ≤ b|i∗ ∈ A∗, |A∗|} > P{Bj ≤ b|j ∈ A∗, |A∗|}
for all b on the common support of the two distributions.29
The intuition, as is noted in Pesendorfer (2000), is that the sole bidder representing
a cartel has a higher hazard rate than a non-colluding bidder. That is, relative to a
competitive bidder, the cartel representative has a higher probability of having a low cost
conditional on the costs being above any fixed threshold. Besides, ex ante symmetry
among bidders implies that
P{Bi ≤ b|i ∈ A∗, |A∗|} = P{Bj ≤ b|j ∈ A∗, |A∗|}
whenever i, j ∈ N(c) or i, j ∈ N(nc) ∩N ′(c).
We can then construct pairwise comparison indexes δij, δ0ij by replacing Gij and Gji in
(B.1) with the left- and right-hand side of (B.6).
Appendix C. Mathematical Proofs
C.1. Proof of Identification Results
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Sufficiency is obvious. We focus on necessity. First consider the
two facts:
Fact 1: If Gτ does not contain a monotone path of length K0 − 1, τ is not identified.
Fact 2: A vertex i is identified if and only if there is a monotone path P containing i such
that its end vertices iH and iL are identified and
τ(iH)− τ(iL) = `(P ),
where `(P ) denotes the length of P .
By Fact 1, the necessity of Gτ containing a monotone path of length K0 − 1 follows,
and Fact 2 completes the proof of the necessity part of the theorem.
Now let us prove Fact 1. Suppose that Gτ does not contain a monotone path of length
K0 − 1. Let Nmax be the set of vertices such that for each vertex i in Nmax, all his Gτ -
neighbors have lower type than the vertex i. Then there is no edge in Gτ which joins any
two vertices from the set Nmax. Choose a vertex i∗ from Nmax which is an end vertex of a
longest monotone path, say, with length K − 1 < K0 − 1. This identifies a lower bound
for K0 but there is no upper bound for K0 that we can obtain from Gτ . Take any τ ′ such
that τ ′(i∗) > τ(i∗) and τ ′(i) = τ(i) for all i ∈ N \ {i∗}. Then τ ′ is compatible with Gτ and
the given comparison indexes, proving that τ is not identified from G.
28Pesendorfer (2000) proved this result using the implicit assumption that the distribution of costs for non-
colluding bidders and that for the sole cartel is common knowledge among all participants in an auction.
(See proof of Remark 3 in Pesendorfer (2000).) This assumption is consistent with the informational
environment that the partition of N into N(c) and N(nc) is common knowledge among all bidders.
29Note that the statement is conditional since the bidding strategies depend on the cardinality of the final
set of bidders |A∗|.
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Let us prove Fact 2. Sufficiency is trivial. Let us focus on necessity. First, suppose to
the contrary that there is no monotone path with identified end vertices which contains
i. Then obviously i is not identified. Therefore, if i is identified, there exists a monotone
path with identified end vertices which contains i. So it suffices to show that if i is
identified, it is necessary that such a monotone path has to have length equal to τ(iH)−
τ(iL).
Suppose to the contrary that every monotone path P that contains i and has identified
end vertices iH and iL also satisfies τ(iH)− τ(iL) > `(P ). Then we will show that i is not
identified.
First, assume that there exists a monotone path which contains i but not as one of
its end vertices. Let i∗H be a lowest type vertex among all the identified vertices each of
which is on a monotone path that contains i and is of higher type than i. Also, let i∗L be a
highest type vertex among all the identified vertices each of which is on a monotone path
that contains i and is of lower type than i. Let P be a monotone path between i∗H and i
∗
L
that passes through i. Then by construction, the type difference τ(i∗H) − τ(i∗L) between
the two end vertices is smallest among all the monotone paths that go through i. By
the condition, we have τ(i∗H) − τ(i∗L) > 2. Therefore, we have multiple different ways
to assign τ(i∗H) − 1, τ(i∗H) − 2, ..., τ(i∗L) + 1 to the vertex i on the path P . Hence i is not
identified.
Second, assume that all the monotone paths that contain i have i as one of their end
vertices. Then either all neighbors of i are of higher type than i or all neighbors of i are
of lower type than i. Suppose that we are in the former case. (The latter case can be
dealt with similarly.) Let i∗H be a lowest type vertex among all the vertices each of which
is on a monotone path that contains i and is of higher type than i. Then by the condition,
τ(i∗H) − τ(i) > 1. Thus we have multiple different ways to assign τ(i∗H) − 1, τ(i∗H) −
2, ..., τ(i) + 1, τ(i) to the vertex i. Hence i is not identified. 
C.2. Lower Level Conditions for Assumption 4.1
Lower level conditions for Assumption 4.1 can be found from the literature of testing
for moment inequality restrictions. For the sake of concreteness, we focus on the situation
where rij(x) arises from difference between two nonparametric regression functions and
the testing procedure is done by the method proposed in Lee, Song, and Whang (2018).
Suppose that we have
gi(x) > gj(x),∀x ∈ X if and only if τ(i) > τ(j);(C.1)
gi(x) = gj(x),∀x ∈ X if and only if τ(i) = τ(j);
gi(x) < gj(x),∀x ∈ X if and only if τ(i) < τ(j),
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where gi(x) = E[Yi`|Xi` = x], i ∈ N , and ` = 1, ..., L, is the sample unit index. Let us
define a kernel estimator of gi(x) as follows:
gˆi(x) =
L∑
`=1
Yi`Kh(Xi` − x)
L∑
`=1
Kh(Xi` − x)
,
where Kh(x) = K(x/h)/h, and K(·) is a multivariate kernel and h is a bandwidth. We let
rˆij(x) = gˆi(x)− gˆj(x).
Then the test statistics we use are defined as
T+ij =
∫
X
max{rˆij(x), 0}dx, T−ij =
∫
X
max{rˆji(x), 0}dx, and(C.2)
T 0ij =
∫
X
|rˆij(x)|dx.
As for the bootstrap test statistics, we first obtain bootstrap samples {(Y ∗i` , X∗i`)i∈N}L`=1
by resampling the vector (Y ∗i` , X
∗
i`)i∈N from the empirical distribution of {(Yi`, Xi`)i∈N}L`=1
with replacement. Using the bootstrap sample, we construct
rˆ∗ij(x) = gˆ
∗
i (x)− gˆ∗j (x),
where
gˆ∗i (x) =
L∑
`=1
Y ∗i`Kh(X
∗
i` − x)
L∑
`=1
Kh(X
∗
i` − x)
.
Then the bootstrap test statistic we use is defined as30
T+∗ij =
∫
X
max{rˆ∗ij(x)− rˆij(x), 0}dx, T−∗ij =
∫
X
max{rˆ∗ji(x)− rˆji(x), 0}dx, and(C.3)
T 0∗ij =
∫
X
|rˆ∗ij(x)− rˆij(x)|dx.
Let the CDF of the bootstrap distribution of T s∗ij be denoted by F
s
ij. Then we set the
pairwise p-value to be pˆsij = 1− F sij(T sij).
Let asij,L and σ
s
ij,L be sequences of constants such that
asij,L = O(1), and σ
s
ij,L → σsij > 0,(C.4)
30One could also use alternative bootstrap statistics using estimated contact sets as in Lee, Song, and
Whang (2018) to enhance the power. For simplicity of exposition, here we present the case where we use
the least favorable configurations.
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as n, L→∞. We take
T˜ sij = (
√
LT sij − h−d/2asij,L)/σsij,L, and(C.5)
T˜ s∗ij = (
√
LT s∗ij − h−d/2asij,L)/σsij,L.
(The researcher does not need to know, estimate, or use the constants asij,L and σ
s
ij,L
for construction of the pairwise p-values and for the implementation of the classification
algorithm of this paper.) Then we can rewrite
pˆsij = 1− F˜ sij(T˜ sij),
where F˜ sij is the CDF of the bootstrap distribution of T˜
s∗
ij . Let ‖ · ‖∞ denote the sup norm,
i.e., ‖f‖∞ = supx |f(x)| for any real function f . Let us consider the following set of
assumptions.
Assumption C.1. (i) For each s ∈ {+, 0,−} and each i, j ∈ N , there exist sequences of
constants asij,L and σ
s
ij,L such that the conditions in (C.4) hold, and
T˜ sij →d N(0, 1),
and ‖F˜ sij − Φ‖∞ = OP (L−α) for some α > 0, and Φ is the CDF of N(0, 1).
(ii) supx∈X |rˆij(x)− rij(x)| = oP (1), as L→∞.
(iii) Suppose that Lhd →∞ while h→ 0 as L→∞.
The lower level conditions for Condition (i) can be found in Lee, Song, and Whang
(2018). Condition (ii) follows if the kernel regression estimators gˆi(x) are uniformly
consistent. (See, e.g., Hansen (2008).) Condition (iii) is a standard bandwidth condition
in the literature of kernel estimators. Then, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma C.1. Suppose that Assumption C.1 holds, and that the sequence rL → ∞ is such
that rL/ logL→ 0 as L→∞. Then Assumption 4.1 holds.
Proof: Condition (i) of Assumption 4.1 follows from Condition (i) of Assumption C.1
with W sij being a standard normal random variable. As for Conditions (ii)-(iv) of Assump-
tion 4.1, we focus on only (ii), because the proof for the other two statements is similar.
Observe that when τ(i) > τ(j), so that
T˜+ij /
√
L = (σ+ij,L)
−1
(∫
max{rˆij(x)− rij(x) + rij(x), 0}dx− L−1/2h−d/2a+ij,L
)
(C.6)
= (σ+ij)
−1
∫
max{rij(x), 0}dx+ oP (1),
by Assumption C.1 (ii). Hence Condition (ii) of Assumption 4.1(ii) follows with
c+ij = (σ
+
ij)
−1
∫
max{rij(x), 0}dx,
and λL =
√
L.
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As for Condition (vi) of Assumption 4.1, note that F sij,∞ = Φ, the standard normal CDF.
Hence there exists C > 0 such that for all t > C,
1− Φ(t) ≤ C exp
(
−Ct
2
2
)
.
Therefore, for any constants c1, c2 > 0, taking λL =
√
L and ρL = L−α, (from some large
L on)
r−1L log
(
1− Φ(c1
√
L) + c2L
−α
)
≤ r−1L log
(
C exp(−Cc21L/2) + c2L−α
)→ −∞,
as L→∞, by the condition that rL/ logL→ 0. 
C.3. Proof of Consistency of Classification
We provide a proof of consistency of the classification allowing both n and L to diverge
to infinity jointly. This requires a more elaborated set of assumptions than Assumption
4.1. It is not hard to use the same proof to prove Theorem 4.1.
Assumption C.2. There exist sequences ρL, κL → 0 and λL → ∞ and constants csij > 0,
s ∈ {+, 0,−} such that along each sequence of probabilities PL ∈ P0,ε, the following
holds for all s ∈ {+, 0,−}, s′ ∈ {+,−}, as n, L→∞.
(i) If τ(i) = τ(j), T˜ sij →d W sij for some random variable W sij with continuous CDF F sij,∞.
(ii)(a) If τ(i) > τ(j), P{|T˜+ij /λL − c+ij|+ |T˜ 0ij/λL − c0ij| ≥ κL} = O(ρL).
(ii)(b) If τ(i) ≥ τ(j), there exists a CDF F−ij such that for all t ∈ R,
P{T˜−ij ≤ t} ≥ F−ij (t).
(iii)(a) If τ(i) < τ(j), P{|T˜−ij /λL − c−ij|+ |T˜ 0ij/λL − c0ij| ≥ κL} = O(ρL).
(iii)(b) If τ(i) ≤ τ(j), there exists a CDF F+ij such that for all t ∈ R,
P{T˜+ij ≤ t} ≥ F+ij (t).
Assumption C.3. Suppose that F s′ij and F
s
ij,∞, s, s
′ ∈ {+, 0,−}, are CDFs and ρL, κL, and
λL are sequences in Assumption C.2. Then the following holds.
(i) P{‖F˜ sij − F sij,∞‖∞ > εL} = O(ρL) and ‖F s′ij − F s′ij,∞‖∞ = O(εL), where εL → 0.
(ii) r−1L log(1− F sij,∞((c− κL)λL) + εL)→ −∞, for any constant c > 0.
(iii) n2(exp(−rL/2) + εL + ρL)→ 0, as n, L→∞.
Assumptions C.2 and C.3 are variants of Assumption 4.1 (except for Assumption C.3(iii))
which require the rate of convergences explicitly. Assumption C.3(iii) is new here because
we now allow both n and L to increase to infinity. This assumption says that for the con-
sistency of the estimated group structure, we need to have n increase sufficiently faster
than L. This condition is trivially satisfied when n is fixed and L increases to infinity.
Note that the conditions are high level conditions suited to the generic set-up here. With
a more detailed specification of the pairwise comparison indexes δij and δ0ij, test statistics
and p-values, one may improve the conditions. Using high level conditions also enables
us to focus only on more novel aspects of the mathematical proofs.
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While existence of such sequences as κL, εL, and ρL is fairly expected, obtaining their
precise forms using lower level conditions require substantial yet tedious arguments de-
pending on the way the test statistics and the p-values are constructed. Essentially what
one needs to obtain for lower level conditions is the rate in the convergence of the test
statistics to the limiting distribution both under the null hypothesis and under the local
alternatives. For example, if one follows the approach of Lee, Song, and Whang (2018),
the rate of convergence is ultimately delivered by a Berry-Esseen bound (for a sum of
independent random variables) used to obtain the asymptotic normality of test statistics
(under appropriate mean shifts). However, the final result comes, in combination with
this, only with carefully derived rate results on asymptotically negligible terms that arise,
among other things, due to the Poissonization technique used in the paper. While these
additional developments are feasible, they do not add insights to the main idea of the
paper. Hence we do not pursue details in this direction here.
Let us first state the theorem.
Theorem C.1. Suppose that Assumptions C.2 - C.3 hold, and that g(L)→∞ and g(L)/rL →
0 as L→∞. Then, for any ε > 0, along a sequence of probabilities Pn,L from P0,ε,
Pn,L{Kˆ = K0} → 1, as n, L→∞,
and the estimated group structure TˆKˆ satisfies that as n, L→∞,
Pn,L{TˆKˆ = T} → 1.
The proof of this theorem is long. We first prepare some auxiliary lemmas. Throughout
this section, we assume that Assumptions C.2 and C.3 hold. First, for any subset N ′ ⊂ N ,
we define N ′(i) = N ′ \ {i}, and let
N ′1(i) = {j ∈ N ′(i) : τ(i) > τ(j)},(C.7)
N ′2(i) = {j ∈ N ′(i) : τ(i) < τ(j)},
N
′
1(i) = {j ∈ N ′(i) : τ(i) ≥ τ(j)}, and
N
′
2(i) = {j ∈ N ′(i) : τ(i) ≤ τ(j)}.
We also define
Nˆ ′1(i) = {j ∈ N ′(i) : log pˆ+ij ≤ log pˆ−ij − rL} and
Nˆ ′2(i) = {j ∈ N ′(i) : log pˆ−ij ≤ log pˆ+ij − rL}.
Following the convention, given a CDF G, we define its generalized inverse G−1 as
G−1(t) = inf{s ∈ R : G(s) ≥ t}, t ∈ (0, 1).
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Lemma C.2. (i) For all i ∈ N ,
P
{
min
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ−ij < −rL/2
}
= O (nωn,L)
P
{
min
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ+ij ≥ −3rL/2
}
= O (nρL)
P
{
min
j∈N ′2(i)
log pˆ+ij < −rL/2
}
= O (nωn,L) , and
P
{
min
j∈N ′2(i)
log pˆ−ij ≥ −3rL/2
}
= O (nρL) ,
where ωn,L = exp(−rL/2) + εL + ρL.
(ii) For all i, j ∈ N such that τ(i) 6= τ(j),
P
{
log pˆ0ij ≥ −rL
}
= O (ρL) ,
and for all i, j ∈ N such that τ(i) = τ(j),
P
{
log pˆ0ij ≤ −rL
}
= O (ωn,L) .
Proof: (i) We will show the first and the second statements only. The third and the
fourth statements can be proved similarly. Let us prove the first statement first. For all
i ∈ N ,
P
{
min
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ−ij < −
rL
2
}
≤
∑
j∈N1(i)
P
{
log pˆ−ij ≤ −
rL
2
}
.
Note that
P
{
log pˆ−ij < −
rL
2
}
= P
{
1−
(
−rL
2
)
< F˜−ij (T˜
−
ij )
}
≤ P
{
1− exp
(
−rL
2
)
< F−ij,∞(T˜
−
ij ) + εL
}
+ P{‖F˜−ij − F−ij,∞‖∞ ≥ εL}
≤ P
{
1− exp
(
−rL
2
)
< F−ij,∞(T˜
−
ij ) + εL
}
+O(ρL),
where the last O(ρL) term is due to Assumption C.3(i) and Markov’s inequality. As for
the leading probability on the right end side, we use the fact that for any CDF G and any
t ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ R, G−1(t) ≥ x if and only if t ≥ G(x), (e.g. Lemma A.1.1. of Reiss
(1989)), and bound
P
{
1− exp
(
−rL
2
)
< F−ij,∞(T˜
−
ij ) + εL
}
= 1− P
{
T˜−ij ≤ (F−ij,∞)−1
(
1− exp
(
−rL
2
)
− εL
)}
≤ 1− F−ij
(
(F−ij,∞)
−1
(
1− exp
(
−rL
2
)
− εL
))
,
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by Assumption C.2(ii)(b) and because j ∈ N ′1(i). By Assumption C.3(i), the last term is
equal to
1− F−ij,∞
(
(F−ij,∞)
−1
(
1− exp
(
−rL
2
)
− εL
))
+O(εL)
≤ exp
(
−rL
2
)
+ εL +O(εL) = O(ωn,L).
Thus we obtain the first statement.
Let us consider the second statement. Suppose that τ(i) > τ(j). We let
A1,L =
{
‖F˜+ij − F+ij,∞‖∞ ≤ εL
}
and A2,L =
{
|T˜+ij /λL − c+ij| ≤ κL
}
,
and let AL = A1,L ∩ A2,L. Note that
P{log pˆ+ij > −rL} ≤ P{log pˆ+ij > −rL} ∩ AL + PAcL
≤ P{log pˆ+ij > −rL} ∩ AL +O(ρL),
where the last O(ρL) term is due to Assumption C.2(ii)(a) and Assumption C.3(i). For
the leading probability on the right hand side, note that
P{log pˆ+ij > −rL} ∩ AL =P{log(1− F˜+ij (T˜+ij )) > −rL} ∩ AL
≤P{log(1− F+ij,∞(T˜+ij ) + εL) > −rL} ∩ AL
≤PAL · 1{1− F+ij,∞((c+ij − κL)λL) + εL > exp(−rL)}.
The last indicator becomes zero from some large L on by Condition (ii) of Assumption
C.3. Thus, we obtain the second statement.
(ii) The proof of the first statement is the same as that of the second statement of (i),
and the proof of the second statement is the same as that of the first statement of (i).
Details are omitted. 
Lemma C.3. Suppose that N ′ ⊂ N contains agents with heterogeneous types. Then, for
each i ∈ N ,
P{N ′1(i) = Nˆ ′1(i)} = 1 +O(nωn,L);
P{N ′2(i) = Nˆ ′2(i)} = 1 +O(nωn,L);
P{N ′2(i) = N ′(i) \ Nˆ ′1(i)} = 1 +O(nωn,L);
P{N ′1(i) = N ′(i) \ Nˆ ′2(i)} = 1 +O(nωn,L).
Proof: We show only the first and the third statements. The remaining statements can
be proved similarly. Define
AL =
{
min
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ−ij ≥ −
rL
2
}
.
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Note that
P
{
N ′1(i) ⊂ Nˆ ′1(i)
}
= P
{
max
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ+ij − log pˆ−ij ≤ −rL
}
≥ P
{
max
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ+ij − min
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ−ij ≤ −rL
}
≥ P
{
max
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ+ij ≤ −
3rL
2
}
∩ AL
≥ P
{
max
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ+ij ≤ −
3rL
2
}
− PAcL
= 1− P
{
max
j∈N ′1(i)
log pˆ+ij > −
3rL
2
}
− PAcL = 1 +O(nωn,L),
where the last inequality follows by the first and the second statements of Lemma C.2(i).
Thus we have
P
{
N ′1(i) ⊂ Nˆ ′1(i)
}
= 1 +O(nωn,L),(C.8)
as n, L→∞. On the other hand,
P
{
N
′
2(i) ⊂ N ′(i) \ Nˆ ′1(i)
}
≥ P
{
min
j∈N ′2(i)
log pˆ+ij − log pˆ−ij > −rL
}
≥ P
{
min
j∈N ′2(i)
log pˆ+ij > −rL
}
= 1 +O(nωn,L).
The second inequality follows because log pˆ−ij ≤ 0 and the last equality follows by the
third statement of Lemma C.2(i). Since N ′1(i) and N
′
2(i) partition N
′(i), and Nˆ ′1(i) and
N ′(i) \ Nˆ ′1(i) also partition N ′(i), it follows that
P{N ′1(i) = Nˆ ′1(i)} = 1 +O(nωn,L), and P{N ′2(i) = N ′(i) \ Nˆ ′1(i)} = 1 +O(nωn,L),
as n, L→∞. The remaining statements can be shown similarly. 
Definition C.1. (i) An ordered partition (N ′1, ..., N
′
s) of a subset N
′ ⊂ N is said to be a
τ -ordered partition, if for any r1 < r2, r1, r2 = 1, 2, ..., s, we have τ(i) < τ(j) whenever
i ∈ N ′r1 and j ∈ N ′r2.
(ii) Let Nτ (N ′) denote the set of τ -ordered partitions of N ′.
When an ordered partition (N ′1, ..., N
′
s) is a τ -ordered partition, and τ partitions N
′ into
K groups (i.e., any two agents, say i, j, from two different groups from the K groups
have τ(i) 6= τ(j)), we must have s ≤ K by the definition of τ -ordered partition. Hence
some group in the ordered partition (N ′1, ..., N
′
s) can have agents with different types.
Definition C.2. An estimated ordered partition (Nˆ ′1, ..., Nˆ
′
s) of a subset N
′ ⊂ N is said to
be asymptotically τ -compatible at rate un,L, if
P{(Nˆ ′1, ..., Nˆ ′s) ∈ Nτ (N ′)} = 1 +O(un,L), as n, L→∞.
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Lemma C.4. For each pi = (N ′1, ..., N
′
s) ∈ Nτ (N), let R1(pi) ⊂ {1, 2, ..., s} be such that for all
r ∈ R1(pi), N ′r has some i, j ∈ N ′r satisfying τ(i) 6= τ(j), and let R2(pi) = {1, 2, ..., s} \R1(pi)
so that for all r ∈ R2(pi), and for all i, j ∈ N ′r, we have τ(i) = τ(j) . Let B(pi), pi ∈ Nτ (N ′),
be disjoint events. Then,∑
pi∈Nτ (N ′)
P
{
∃r1 ∈ R1(pi), min
i,j∈Nr1
log pˆ0ij > −rL
}
∩B(pi) = O(n2ρL), and
∑
pi∈Nτ (N ′)
P
{
∃r2 ∈ R2(pi), min
i,j∈Nr2
log pˆ0ij ≤ −rL
}
∩B(pi) = O(n2ωn,L).
Proof: For each pi ∈ Nτ (N ′), we write K(pi) = |R1(pi)| + |R2(pi)|, i.e., the total num-
ber of the groups in pi, and if pi = (N ′1, ..., N
′
K(pi)) ∈ Nτ (N ′), we write (N ′1, ..., N ′K(pi)) =
(N ′1(pi), ..., N
′
K(pi)(pi)) to make explicit the dependence of each group on pi ∈ Nτ (N ′). Let
Bτ (N
′) =
⋃
pi∈Nτ (N ′)
B(pi).
The first statement of the lemma follows because∑
pi∈Nτ (N ′)
P
{
∃r1 ∈ R1(pi), min
i,j∈N ′r1 (pi)
log pˆ0ij > −rL
}
∩B(pi)
≤
∑
pi∈Nτ (N ′)
∑
i,j∈N :τ(i)6=τ(j)
P
{
log pˆ0ij > −rL
} ∩B(pi)
=
∑
i,j∈N :τ(i)6=τ(j)
P
{
log pˆ0ij > −rL
} ∩Bτ (N ′)
≤
∑
i,j∈N :τ(i)6=τ(j)
P
{
log pˆ0ij > −rL
}
= O(n2ρL),
by the assumption that B(pi)’s are disjoint. The last equality follows by Lemma C.2(ii).
As for the second statement of the lemma, similarly,∑
pi∈Nτ (N ′)
P
{
∃r2 ∈ R2(pi), min
i,j∈Nr2
log pˆ0ij ≤ −rL
}
∩B(pi) ≤
∑
i,j∈N :τ(i)=τ(j)
P
{
log pˆ0ij ≤ −rL
}
.
Again, the last sum is O(n2ωn,L) by Lemma C.2(ii). 
Lemma C.5. Suppose that an estimated ordered partition (Nˆ1, ..., Nˆs) of N is asymptotically
τ -compatible at rate un,L. Then the Selection Step in the Selection-Split Algorithm applied
to this ordered partition selects with a set, say, Nˆrˆ, such that
P{∃i, j ∈ Nˆrˆ, τ(i) 6= τ(j)} = 1 +O(n2ωn,L + un,L),
as n, L→∞.
Proof: Let us consider the event that (Nˆ1, ..., Nˆs) coincides with a τ -ordered partition,
say, pi = (N1(pi), ..., Ns(pi)) ∈ Nτ (N), and denote the event by A(pi). Note that A(pi)’s are
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disjoint across pi ∈ Nτ (N), and∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
PA(pi) = 1 +O(un,L),(C.9)
by the assumption that (Nˆ1, ..., Nˆs) of N is asymptotically τ -compatible with un,L. Corre-
sponding to this pi, let R1(pi) and R2(pi) be as defined in Lemma C.4. Then,∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P {rˆ ∈ R1(pi)} ∩ A(pi)(C.10)
≥
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∀r1 ∈ R1(pi),∀r2 ∈ R2(pi), min
i,j∈Nˆr1
log pˆ0ij < min
i,j∈Nˆr2
log pˆ0ij
}
∩ A(pi).
Note that
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∀r1 ∈ R1(pi),∀r2 ∈ R2(pi), min
i,j∈Nˆr1
log pˆ0ij < min
i,j∈Nˆr2
log pˆ0ij
}
∩ A(pi)
(C.11)
≥
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∀r1 ∈ R1(pi),∀r2 ∈ R2(pi), min
i,j∈Nˆr1
log pˆ0ij ≤ −rL, min
i,j∈Nˆr2
log pˆ0ij > −rL
}
∩ A(pi)
≥
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∀r2 ∈ R2(pi), min
i,j∈Nˆr2
log pˆ0ij > −rL
}
∩ A(pi)
−
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∃r1 ∈ R1(pi), min
i,j∈Nˆr1
log pˆ0ij > −rL
}
∩ A(pi).
The second to the last sum in (C.11) is written as∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∀r2 ∈ R2(pi), min
i,j∈Nr2 (pi)
log pˆ0ij > −rL
}
∩ A(pi)
=
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
PA(pi)−
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∃r2 ∈ R2(pi), min
i,j∈Nr2 (pi)
log pˆ0ij ≤ −rL
}
∩ A(pi).
The difference on the right hand side is 1 + O(n2ωn,L + un,L) by the second statement of
Lemma C.4 and (C.9). On the other hand, the last sum in (C.11) is equal to∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∃r1 ∈ R1(pi), min
i,j∈Nr1 (pi)
log pˆ0ij > −rL
}
∩ A(pi) = O(n2ρL),
by the first statement of Lemma C.4. Since ρL = O(ωn,L), we find that∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P {rˆ ∈ R1(pi)} ∩ A(pi) = 1 +O(n2ωn,L + un,L),(C.12)
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as n, L→∞.
Thus, we have ∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∃i, j ∈ Nˆrˆ, τ(i) 6= τ(j)
}
(C.13)
≥
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
∃i, j ∈ Nˆrˆ, τ(i) 6= τ(j)
}
∩ A(pi)
≥
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P {∃i, j ∈ N ′rˆ, τ(i) 6= τ(j)} ∩ A(pi)
=
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P {rˆ ∈ R1(pi)} ∩ A(pi) = 1 +O(n2ωn,L + un,L),
by (C.12). Thus we obtain the desired result. 
Lemma C.6. For any set N ′ ⊂ N with agents of heterogeneous types, the ordered partition
(Nˆ ′1, Nˆ
′
2) of N
′ obtained by the Split Algorithm is asymptotically τ -compatible at rate n2ωn,L.
Proof: We use the definitions of N ′1(i), N
′
1(i), N
′
2(i), and N
′
2(i) as in (C.7). By Lemma
C.3, for each i ∈ N ′, the ordered partitions Tˆ1(i) = (Nˆ ′1(i), N ′(i) \ Nˆ ′1(i)) and Tˆ2(i) =
(N ′(i) \ Nˆ ′2(i), Nˆ ′2(i)) are such that for T1(i) = (N ′1(i), N ′2(i)) and T2(i) = (N ′1(i), N ′2(i)),
we have
P{Tˆ1(i) = T1(i)} = 1 +O(nωn,L), and P{Tˆ2(i) = T2(i)} = 1 +O(nωn,L).
Therefore,
P{Tˆ1(i) 6= T1(i)}+ P{Tˆ2(i) 6= T2(i)} = O(nωn,L),(C.14)
as n, L→∞. Define Tˆ = (Nˆ ′1, Nˆ ′2) and note that
Tˆ = (Nˆ ′1(i
∗), (N ′(i∗) \ Nˆ ′1(i∗)) ∪ {i∗}), or
Tˆ = ((N ′(i∗) \ Nˆ ′2(i∗)) ∪ {i∗}, Nˆ ′2(i∗)),
depending on whether s1(i∗) ≤ s2(i∗) or s1(i∗) > s2(i∗). Hence
P{Tˆ ∈ Nτ (N ′)} =
∑
i∈N ′
P{Tˆ1(i) = T1(i), i = i∗, s1(i) ≤ s2(i)}(C.15)
+
∑
i∈N ′
P{Tˆ2(i) = T2(i), i = i∗, s1(i) > s2(i)}+O(n2ωn,L),
by (C.14). Now, the leading sum on the right hand side is bounded from below by∑
i∈N ′
(P{i∗ = i, s1(i) ≤ s2(i)} − P{Tˆ1(i) 6= T (i)}).
Applying the same argument to the last sum in (C.15), we obtain that
P{Tˆ ∈ Nτ (N ′)} ≥ 1−
∑
i∈N ′
(
P{Tˆ1(i) 6= T1(i)}+ P{Tˆ2(i) 6= T2(i)}
)
+O(n2ωn,L),
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as n, L→∞. Hence by (C.14), we conclude that
P{Tˆ ∈ Nτ (N ′)} = 1 +O(n2ωn,L),
as n, L→∞. 
Lemma C.7. Suppose that for some s < K0, an estimated ordered partition (Nˆ1, ..., Nˆs) of
N is asymptotically τ -compatible at rate un,L.
Then a new ordered partition (Nˆ ′1, ..., Nˆ
′
s+1) of N obtained by applying the Selection-Split
Algorithm to (Nˆ1, ..., Nˆs) is asymptotically τ -compatible at rate n2ωn,L + un,L.
Proof: For each pi ∈ Nτ (N), let us consider the event that (Nˆ1, ..., Nˆs) coincides with the
τ -ordered partition, say, pi = (N ′1(pi), ..., N
′
s(pi)), and denote the event by A(pi). Let R1(pi)
be as in the proof of Lemma C.5. For each r ∈ R1(pi), let Bs(r; pi) be the event that the
split of N ′r into Nˆ
′
r,1 ∪ Nˆ ′r,2 (according to the Split Algorithm) coincides with N ′r,1 ∪ N ′r,2
such that
(N ′1(pi), ..., N
′
r−1(pi), N
′
r,1, N
′
r,2, N
′
r+1(pi), ..., N
′
s(pi)) ∈ Nτ (N).
Let rˆ be the chosen group index among 1, ..., s by the Selection Step. From the proof of
Lemma C.5 (see (C.13)), we have∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P {rˆ ∈ R1(pi)} ∩ A(pi) = 1 +O(n2ωn,L + un,L).(C.16)
The probability that the new ordered partition (Nˆ ′1, ..., Nˆ
′
s+1) of N belongs to Nτ (N) is
bounded from below by∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P (Bs(rˆ; pi) ∩ A(pi)) ≥
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P {rˆ ∈ R1(pi)} ∩ A(pi) ∩Bs(rˆ; pi)
=
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
∑
r∈R1(pi)
P {rˆ = r} ∩ A(pi) ∩Bs(r; pi)
=
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
∑
r∈R1(pi)
P {rˆ = r} ∩ A(pi) +O(n2ωn,L),
by Lemma C.6. The last double sum is 1 +O(n2ωn,L +un,L) by (C.16). Thus, we conclude
that
P{(Nˆ ′1, ..., Nˆ ′s+1) ∈ Nτ (N)} = 1 +O(n2ωn,L + un,L),
as n, L→∞. 
For each K ≥ 1, let TˆK = (Nˆ1, ..., NˆK) be the group structure obtained through
the Selection-Split algorithm (until the number of the groups reach K) and let T =
(N1, ..., NK0) be the true ordered group structure. For the remainder of the proof, we
assume that the conditions of Theorem C.1 holds.
Lemma C.8. Along any sequence of probabilities Pn,L ∈ P0,ε,
Pn,L{TˆK0 = T} = 1 +O(n2ωn,L),
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as n, L→∞.
Proof: Note that TˆK0 = (Nˆ1, ..., NˆK0) is asymptotically τ -compatible at rate n
2ωn,L by
Lemmas C.6 and C.7. Since T has K0 groups, this gives the desired result. 
Lemma C.9. (i) If K ≥ K0, then Vˆ (K) = OP (1), as n, L→∞.
(ii) If K < K0, then for any M > 0, as n, L→∞,
P{Vˆ (K) > g(L)M} → 1.
Proof: (i) Let (Nˆ1, ..., NˆK0) be the ordered partition obtained by the Selection-Split Al-
gorithm. By Lemma C.8, the event that τ(i) = τ(j) for all i, j ∈ Nˆk has probability
approaching one for all k = 1, ..., K0. Let (Nˆ ′1, ..., Nˆ
′
K) be the ordered partition obtained
by the Selection-Split Algorithm with K ≥ K0.
Since K ≥ K0, due to the sequential split nature of the algorithm, each of the resulting
groups, say, Nˆ ′k, k = 1, ..., K, is a subset of a group, say, Nˆr, obtained at step K = K0.
Therefore, the event that τ(i) = τ(j) for all i, j ∈ Nˆ ′k has probability approaching one for
each k = 1, ..., K. By Assumption C.2(i), we have
Vˆ (K) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣ mini,j∈Nˆ ′k log pˆ0ij
∣∣∣∣∣ = OP (1),
as n, L→∞. Thus (i) follows.
(ii) Suppose that K < K0, and fix any M > 0. Let (Nˆ1, ..., NˆK) be the ordered partition
obtained by the Selection-Split Algorithm. Let the event that pi ∈ Nτ (N) coincides with
(Nˆ1, ..., NˆK) be denoted by AK(pi). The event is disjoint across pi ∈ Nτ (N). By Lemmas
C.6 and C.7, this ordered partition is asymptotically τ -compatible at rate n2ωn,L, that is,
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
PAK(pi) = P
 ⋃
pi∈Nτ (N)
PAK(pi)
 = 1 +O(n2ωn,L).(C.17)
Then we have
P{Vˆ (K) > g(L)M} = P
{
1
K
K∑
k=1
min
i,j∈Nˆk
log pˆ0ij < −g(L)M
}
(C.18)
≥
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
1
K
K∑
k=1
min
i,j∈Nˆk
log pˆ0ij < −g(L)M
}
∩ AK(pi)
≥
∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{
min
i,j∈Nˆkˆ(pi)
log pˆ0ij < −g(L)KM
}
∩ AK(pi),
because the log of p-values are non-positive. Since K < K0, for any pi ∈ Nτ (N) such
that pi = (Nˆ1, ..., NˆK), there exists kˆ(pi) ∈ {1, ...., K} such that for some i, j ∈ Nˆkˆ(pi),
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τ(i) 6= τ(j). Hence the last sum in (C.18) is bounded from below by∑
pi∈Nτ (N)
P
{∀i, j ∈ N, s.t. τ(i) 6= τ(j), log pˆ0ij < −g(L)KM} ∩ AK(pi)
≥ P {∀i, j ∈ N, s.t. τ(i) 6= τ(j), log pˆ0ij < −g(L)KM}+O(n2ωn,L),
by (C.17). By the condition that g(L)/rL → 0 as n, L→∞, the last probability is bounded
from below by (from some large L on)
P
{∀i, j ∈ N, s.t. τ(i) 6= τ(j), log pˆ0ij < −rL}
= 1− P {∃i, j ∈ N, s.t. τ(i) 6= τ(j), log pˆ0ij ≥ −rL} = 1 +O(n2ρL),
by Lemma C.2(ii). 
Lemma C.10. P{Kˆ = K0} → 1 as n, L→∞.
Proof: Choose K such that K0 < K and write
Qˆ(K0)− Qˆ(K) = Vˆ (K0)− Vˆ (K) + (K0 −K)g(L).
As for the leading term on the left hand side, we have
Vˆ (K0)− Vˆ (K) = OP (1),
by Lemma C.9(i). Since g(L)→∞, we find that whenever K > K0, we have
P
{
Qˆ(K0) < Qˆ(K)
}
→ 1.
And for all K < K0, we have by Lemma C.9(ii), for any M > 0,
(C.19) P
{
Vˆ (K) > g(L)M
}
→ 1,
whereas Vˆ (K0) = OP (1). Therefore, choose ε > 0 and take any M ′ > 0 such that
P{Vˆ (K0) ≥M ′} ≤ ε.
We take large M > K0 −K and 0 < M ′ ≤ (K −K0 +M)g(L). We find that
P
{
Qˆ(K0) < Qˆ(K)
}
= P
{
Vˆ (K0) < Vˆ (K) + (K −K0)g(L)
}
≥ P
{
Vˆ (K0) < (K −K0 +M)g(L)
}
+ o(1), (by (C.19))
≥ P
{
Vˆ (K0) ≤M ′
}
+ o(1) ≥ 1− ε+ o(1),
as L→∞. By sending ε down to zero, we conclude that P{Kˆ = K0} → 1, as n, L→∞.

Proof of Theorem C.1: The desired result follows from Lemmas C.8 and C.10. 
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Appendix D. Confidence Sets for the Group Structure
The web appendix of Krasnokutskaya, Song, and Tang (2018) proposes a method to
construct a confidence set for each group of agents having the same type. Here for the
sake of readers’ convenience, we reproduce the procedure here using the notation of this
paper. Let us consider a set-up where we have K0 groups and the set N of agents. Let Kˆ
be the consistent estimator of K0 as proposed in Krasnokutskaya, Song, and Tang (2019).
As for confidence sets, we construct a confidence set for each group of agents who have
the same type. First, we fix k = 1, ..., Kˆ and construct a confidence set for the k-th type
group Nk. In other words, we construct a random set Cˆk ⊂ N such that
liminfL→∞P{Nk ⊂ Cˆk} ≥ 1− α,
For this, we need to devise a way to approximate the finite sample probabilities like
P{Nk ⊂ Cˆk}. Since we do not know the cross-sectional dependence structure among the
agents, we use a bootstrap procedure that preserves the dependence structure from the
original sample. The remaining issue is to determine the space in which the random set
Cˆk ⊂ N can take values in. It is computationally infeasible to consider all possible such
sets. Instead, we proceed as follows. First we estimate Nˆk as prescribed in the paper
and also obtain δˆ0ij, the test statistic defined in the main text. Given the estimate Nˆk, we
construct a sequence of sets as follows:
Step 1: Find i1 ∈ N\Nˆk that minimizes minj∈Nˆk δˆ0i1j, and construct Cˆk(1) = Nˆk ∪ {i1}.
Step 2: Find i2 ∈ N\Cˆk(1) that minimizes minj∈Cˆk(1)δˆ0i2j, and construct Cˆk(2) = Cˆk(1) ∪
{i2}.
Step m: Find im ∈ N\Cˆk(m − 1) that minimizes minj∈Cˆk(m−1)δˆ0imj and construct Cˆk(m) =
Cˆk(m− 1) ∪ {im}.
Repeat Step m up to n = |N |.
Now, for each bootstrap iteration s = 1, ..., B, we construct the sets Nˆ∗k,s and {Cˆ∗k,s(m)}
following the steps described above but using the bootstrap sample. (Note that this boot-
strap sample should be drawn independently of the bootstrap sample used to construct
bootstrap p-values pˆij in the classification.)
Then, we compute the following:
pˆik(m) ≡ 1
B
B∑
s=1
1
{
Nˆk ⊂ Cˆ∗k,s(m)
}
.
Note that the sequence of sets Cˆ∗k,s(m) increases in m. Hence the number pˆik(m) should
also increase in m. An (1 − α)%-level confidence set is given by Cˆ∗k(m) with 1 ≤ m ≤ n
such that
pˆik(m− 1) < 1− α ≤ pˆik(m).
Note that such m always exists, because Cˆ∗k,s(n) = N .
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Appendix E. Further Simulation Results
Tables E.1 and E.2 summarize the distribution of estimation errors in our group classifi-
cation algorithm from 500 simulated data sets, when the number of groups is K0 = 2 and
assumed known to the econometrician. The column Dµ shows the difference between the
group means chosen in the simulation.
When K0 = 2, the results show that the estimation error, as measured by the expected
average discrepancy (EAD), decreases with the distance between group means. Such
a reduction in EAD is most substantial when the number of agents is larger (n = 40)
and the size of the data is small (L = 100). Given group difference, EAD decreases as
sample size increases moderately from L = 100 to 400. This pattern is most obvious when
Dµ = 0.2.
The other measure of estimation errors, HAD(p), also shows encouraging results.
HAD(p) is zero for most of the cells in both panels (a) and (b), which shows that the
empirical distribution of proportion of mis-classified bidders is reasonably skewed to the
right. Besides, the reduction in HAD(p) as the sample size increases is most pronounced
with closer group means, regardless of the number of bidders in the population.
When K0 = 4, the results demonstrate very similar patterns. Most remarkably, both
measures of mis-classification errors only increase very marginally relative to the case
with K0 = 2.
Tables E.3 and E.4 report results from the full, feasible classification procedure when
the number of groups is estimated through the penalization scheme proposed in the text.
For most of the specifications used in these two tables, the estimates for the number
of groups Kˆ0 are tightly clustered around the correct K0. Compared with the results
for infeasible classification under known K0, EAD and HAD(p) increase in most cases.
Nonetheless such an increase is quite moderate, suggesting that our feasible classification
algorithm performs reasonably well relative to its infeasible counterpart.
In Tables E.3 - E.4, we report the analysis of computation time for the classification
procedure. In Table 5.3, we give a decomposition of the time that it took for the classifi-
cation procedure. The table clearly shows that the major computation time spent is when
we construct bootstrap p-values. Once the p-values are constructed, the classification
algorithm itself runs fairly fast.
In Table E.4 , the computation time is shown to vary depending on the number of the
agents (n), the number of the true groups (K0), and the number of the markets (L).
The results show that the most computation time increase arises when the number of
the bidders increases rather than when the number of the markets or the number of the
groups increases. Our simulation studies are based on our MatLab code. The program
was executed using a computer with the following specifications: Intel(R) Xeon (R) CPU
X5690 @3.47 GHz 3.46 GHz.
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Table E.1 : Performance of the Classification Estimator with Two Groups:
(K0 = 2 and known)
n L Dµ EAD HAD(.10) HAD(.25) HAD(.50) HAD(.75) HAD(.90)
12 400 0.6 0.012 0.012 0 0 0 0
12 400 0.4 0.014 0.014 0 0 0 0
12 400 0.2 0.004 0.004 0 0 0 0
12 200 0.6 0.004 0.004 0 0 0 0
12 200 0.4 0.006 0.006 0 0 0 0
12 200 0.2 1.118 0.560 0.252 0.158 0 0
12 100 0.6 0.006 0.006 0 0 0 0
12 100 0.4 0.084 0.078 0.006 0 0 0
12 100 0.2 1.794 0.682 0.478 0.284 0 0
40 400 0.6 0.018 0 0 0 0 0
40 400 0.4 0.022 0 0 0 0 0
40 400 0.2 1.170 0.178 0.014 0 0 0
40 200 0.6 0.018 0 0 0 0 0
40 200 0.4 0.020 0 0 0 0 0
40 200 0.2 2.726 0.404 0.210 0.122 0.021 0.001
40 100 0.6 0.020 0 0 0 0 0
40 100 0.4 0.452 0.010 0 0 0 0
40 100 0.2 3.720 0.902 0.578 0.234 0.132 0.043
Note: This table summarizes the distribution of estimation errors in our classification algorithm from 500
Monte Carlo replications when K0 = 4 and known. Here n represents the number of the individual
agents, L the number of the observed games in the data, Dµ the distance between population means, EAD
the expected average discrepancy, and HAD(p) the hazard rate of average discrepancies at p.
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Table E.2 : Performance of the Classification Estimator with Four Groups:
(K0 = 4 and known)
n L Dµ EAD HAD(.10) HAD(.25) HAD(.50) HAD(.75) HAD(.90)
12 400 0.6 0.011 0.014 0.004 0 0 0
12 400 0.4 0.018 0.016 0.010 0 0 0
12 400 0.2 0.017 0.022 0.006 0 0 0
12 200 0.6 0.013 0.018 0.004 0 0 0
12 200 0.4 0.004 0.008 0 0 0 0
12 200 0.2 1.112 0.764 0.188 0.024 0.008 0
12 100 0.6 0.003 0.006 0 0 0 0
12 100 0.4 0.044 0.040 0.024 0.002 0 0
12 100 0.2 1.504 0.868 0.342 0.106 0.04 0
40 400 0.6 0.115 0.020 0.020 0 0 0
40 400 0.4 0.121 0.020 0.020 0 0 0
40 400 0.2 2.450 0.680 0.368 0.018 0.018 0
40 200 0.6 0.109 0.018 0.018 0 0 0
40 200 0.4 0.140 0.026 0.026 0 0 0
40 200 0.2 3.172 0.810 0.366 0.246 0.026 0
40 100 0.6 0.141 0.024 0.024 0 0 0
40 100 0.4 1.003 0.176 0.176 0.006 0 0
40 100 0.2 4.557 0.904 0.652 0.526 0.202 0.053
Note: This table summarizes the distribution of estimation errors in our classification algorithm from 500
Monte Carlo replications when K0 = 4 and known. Here n represents the number of the individual
agents, L the number of the observed games in the data, Dµ the distance between population means, EAD
the expected average discrepancy, and HAD(p) the hazard rate of average discrepancies at p.
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Table E.3 : Computational Time for Various Steps of the Procedure
(n = 60, K0 = 2, unknown, time measured in seconds)
Step Description L=100 L=200 L=400
1 generating pairwise indexes from the data 0.2987 0.3543 0.4607
2 constructing bootstrap pairwise indexes 81.2178 81.4871 82.0807
3 computing bootstrap p-values 0.0012 0.0014 0.0014
4 division of a group into two 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
n+4 number of groups selection 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Total Time 81.528 81.852 82.552
Note: The table shows a decomposition of a total time it has taken for the classification procedure. The
table shows that the major portion of the time comes from constructing the bootstrap pairwise indexes.
Once the bootstrap p-values are constructed, the classification algorithm runs quite fast.
Table E.4 : Total Computational Time: across n, L, and K0
(K0 unknown, time measured in seconds)
L=100 L=200 L=400 L=200 L=200
K0=2 K0=2 K0=2 K0=4 K0=6
n = 12 3.246 3.224 3.239 3.216 3.219
n = 24 13.057 13.177 13.259 13.185 13.189
n = 48 51.987 52.272 52.700 52.281 52.291
n = 60 81.528 81.852 82.552 81.862 82.874
n = 72 116.949 117.213 117.577 116.912 117.328
n = 96 209.426 209.971 209.834 209.884 210.058
Note: The table shows the change in the computation time as one changes the number of the groups (K),
the number of the markets and the number of the agents (i.e., bidders) ((n)). The major increase in the
computation time arises when the number of the bidders increases rather than when the number of the
markets or the groups increases.
56
Appendix F. Additional Materials for the Empirical Application
Table F.1 reports summary statistics for this set of projects. The table indicates that the
projects are worth $523,000 and last for around three months on average; 38% of these
projects are partially supported through federal funds. There are 25 firms that participate
regularly in this market. All other firms in the data are treated as fringe bidders. An
average auction attracts six regular potential bidders and eight fringe bidders. Since only
a fraction of potential bidders submits bids, an entry decision plays an important role in
this market. Finally, the distance to the company location varies quite a bit and is around
28 miles on average for regular potential bidders.
Table F.1 : Summary Statistics for California Procurement Market
Variable Mean Std. Dev
Engineer’s estimate (mln) 0.523 0.261
Duration, large projects (months) 3.01 1.56
Federal Aid 0.384
Number of Potential Bidders: 14.1 8.4
Fringe Bidders 8.2 4.8
Regular Bidders 5.5 3.3
Number of Entrants: 5.4 2.8
Fringe Bidders 3.5 2.7
Regular Bidders 1.9 1.8
Distance (miles): 18.72 6.33
Fringe Bidders 11.21 5.42
Regular Bidders 28.34 11.73
Note: This table reports summary statistics for the set of medium size bridge work and paving projects
auctioned in the California highway procurement market between years of 2002 and 2012. It consists of
1,054 projects. The distance variable is measured in miles. It reflects the driving time between the project
site and the nearest company plant. The “Federal Aid” variable is equal to one if the project receives
federal aid and zero otherwise.
In Table F.2, we present an extended version of Table 6 in Section 6 of the main paper.
This table includes the estimates of the group-specific fixed effects.
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Table F.2 : Parameter Estimates (Extended Version of Table 6.)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
The Distribution of Project Costs
Constant (q¯0) 0.127∗∗∗ (0.0129) 0.113∗∗∗ (0.0119)
Eng. Estimate -0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0002) -0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Duration 0.00026∗ (0.00036) 0.00022∗ (0.00027)
Distance 0.0012∗∗∗ (0.00022) 0.00086∗∗∗ (0.00019)
Bridge -0.0092∗∗∗ (0.0018) -0.012∗∗∗ (0.0011)
Federal Aid -0.043∗∗∗ (0.0103) -0.078∗∗∗ (0.009)
Regular Bidder -0.035∗∗∗ (0.003)
q¯1 − q¯0 -0.051∗∗∗ (0.008)
q¯2 − q¯0 -0.012∗∗∗ (0.005)
q¯3 − q¯0 -0.032∗∗∗ (0.009)
q¯4 − q¯0 -0.058∗∗∗ (0.008)
q¯5 − q¯0 -0.014∗∗∗ (0.007)
q¯6 − q¯0 -0.008∗∗∗ (0.006)
q¯7 − q¯0 -0.009∗∗∗ (0.007)
q¯8 − q¯0 -0.050∗∗∗ (0.006)
σC 0.087∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.112∗∗∗ (0.022)
σU 0.021∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.0207∗∗∗ (0.008)
The Distribution of Entry Costs
Constant (q˜0) -0.0114∗ (0.0078) -0.0161∗ 0.0091
Eng. Estimate 0.0055∗∗∗ (0.0016) 0.0051∗∗∗ (0.0012)
Number of Items 0.0018∗ (0.0011) 0.0011∗∗∗ (0.0005)
Regular Bidder -0.022 ∗∗∗ (0.004)
q˜1 − q˜0 -0.019∗∗∗ (0.005)
q˜2 − q˜0 -0.018∗∗∗ (0.007)
q˜3 − q˜0 -0.016∗∗∗ (0.007)
q˜4 − q˜0 -0.024∗∗∗ (0.006)
q˜5 − q˜0 -0.022∗∗∗ (0.008)
q˜6 − q˜0 -0.018∗∗∗ (0.006)
q˜7 − q˜0 -0.017∗∗∗ (0.008)
q˜8 − q˜0 -0.019∗∗∗ (0.008)
Note: In the results above the distance is measured in miles. The fringe bidders are the reference group.
The first two columns correspond to the specification which allows for the unobserved bidder
heterogeneity; the last two columns correspond to the specification without unobserved bidder
heterogeneity. The results are based on the data for 1,054 medium-sized projects that involve paving and
bridge work.
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